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Non-technical summary 
 
As a response to the recent economic and financial crisis the European Commission, at the end of 
2008, adopted the „Temporary Framework for State aid measures“ to tackle the effects of the credit 
squeeze on the real economy. This Framework introduced new instruments for State aid and 
simplified legal procedures for granting State aid. In parallel to those temporary instruments, 
traditional public support instruments (e.g. scrapping schemes, loans of the European Investment 
Bank) were used to support the European economy to overcome the crisis. The European car industry 
appears to be one of the major beneficiaries of that overall public support and especially under the 
Temporary Framework. However, although public support measures can help address the short-term 
challenges the car industry faces, they may undermine its long-term competitiveness, e.g. by 
postponing the settlement of structural problems (such as overcapacity). 
 
In this paper we provide an overview of public support for the European car industry during the past 
decade. First, we identify the most relevant instruments of public support, and review their economic 
assessment. The European Commission increasingly recognizes the role of economic analysis in 
controlling public aid to the car industry. However, the degree of economic assessment varies across 
different instruments of public support and individual state aid cases. Moreover, the state aid 
legislative framework is open to derogations and interpretations. In particular, the „Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures“ de facto implied a relaxation of the state aid rules and foresaw no 
formal control of individual state aids. 
 
Second, we estimate the amount of public support for European car manufacturers. Three factors 
complicate the overall quantification of public support for each instrument: (i) the Commission does 
not scrutinize, and hence does not quantify all public support measures; (ii) the available information 
depends on whether the state aid is granted to individual companies or in the form of general 
schemes; and (iii) the available information depends on whether the aid is granted in the form of a 
grant, soft loan or guarantee. Our lower bound estimate of state aid suggests that the aid declined over 
the pre-crisis period, but peaked to €1.2 billion as a response to the financial and economic crisis in 
2009. Perhaps even more strikingly, this state aid was combined with an unprecedented amount of 
public support granted through scrapping schemes of at least €4.0 billion, and loans of the European 
Investment Bank of €2.8 billion, or an equivalent of €400 million of „aid element“. 
 
In conclusion, the existence of multiple public support instruments at different levels may create 
coordination problems and a lack of transparency, in spite of the Commission's efforts. The lack of 
transparency in turn poses a challenge for the quantification of state aid and non-state aid support to 
any industry or sector. This paper provides a first step towards informing the policy debate about the 
effects of public support to the car sector, and also stimulates the academic interest in the subject of 
state aid, and - more generally - public transfers to companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Als Antwort auf die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise verabschiedete die Europäische Kommission Ende 
2008 den „Vorübergehenden Gemeinschaftsrahmen für staatliche Beihilfen“ als Maßnahme gegen die 
Auswirkungen der Kreditklemme auf die Realwirtschaft. Durch diesen Gemeinschaftsrahmen wurden 
neuartige Instrumente für staatliche Beihilfen und vereinfachte rechtliche Verfahren zur Bewilligung 
staatlicher Förderung eingeführt. Parallel zu diesen zeitlich begrenzten Instrumenten wurden 
traditionelle staatliche Fördermaßnahmen (z.B. Abwrackaktionen, Kredite der Europäischen 
Investitionsbank) ergriffen, um der europäischen Wirtschaft durch die Krise zu helfen. Die 
europäische Automobilindustrie scheint am meisten von diesen allgemeinen staatlichen Beihilfen, und 
besonders vom Vorübergehenden Gemeinschaftsrahmen zu profitieren. Doch obwohl staatliche 
Fördermaßnahmen dazu beitragen können, die kurzfristigen Herausforderungen der 
Automobilindustrie zu meistern, ist möglich, dass sie ihre langfristige Wettbewerbsfähigkeit 
gefährden, beispielsweise indem die Lösung struktureller Probleme aufgeschoben wird.  
 
In diesem Papier geben wir einen umfassenden Blick über die öffentliche Unterstützung für die 
europäische Automobilindustrie im letzten Jahrzehnten. Zunächst erfassen wir die wichtigsten 
Instrumente der öffentlichen Unterstützung, und besprechen ihre ökonomische Beurteilung. Wir 
stellen fest, dass die Europäische Kommission zunehmend die Bedeutung der ökonomischen Analyse 
für die Kontrolle der staatlichen Beihilfen für die Automobilindustrie erkennt. Jedoch unterscheidet 
sich die ökonomische Beurteilung je nach Instrument der öffentlichen Unterstützung und 
individuellem Beihilfefall. Darüber hinaus ist der Beihilfenrechtsrahmen für Abweichungen und 
Interpretationen offen. Insbesondere brachte der „Vorübergehende Gemeinschaftsrahmen für 
staatliche Beihilfen“ de facto eine Lockerung der Regeln für die staatlichen Beihilfen mit sich und sah 
keine formale Kontrolle der einzelnen staatlichen Beihilfen vor. 
 
Zweitens schätzen wir die Höhe der gewährten öffentlichen Unterstützung für die europäischen 
Automobilhersteller. Drei Faktoren erschweren die allgemeine Quantifizierung der öffentlichen 
Unterstützung für jedes Instrument: (i) Die Kommission prüft nicht, und somit quantifiziert nicht alle 
öffentlichen Stützungsmaßnahmen. (ii) Die verfügbaren Informationen sind davon abhängig, ob die 
staatlichen Beihilfen an einzelne Unternehmen gewährt werden, oder in Form von allgemeinen 
Beihilferegelungen bewilligt werden. (iii) Die verfügbaren Informationen hängen davon ab, ob eine 
Beihilfe in Form eines Zuschusses, eines zinsgünstigen Kredits oder einer Bürgschaft bewilligt wird. 
Unser unterer Schätzwert der staatlichen Beihilfen weist darauf hin, dass die Beihilfen für die 
Automobilindustrie über den Wert der Zeit vor der Krise zurückgegangen sind. Sie erreichten 2009 
jedoch 1,2 Mrd. € als Reaktion auf die Finanz-und Wirtschaftskrise. Noch auffallender ist es, dass 
diese staatlichen Beihilfen mit einer beispiellosen Höhe öffentlicher Unterstützungsmaßnahmen durch 
die Abwrackprämien von mindestens 4,0 Mrd. € sowie durch Kredite der Europäischen 
Investitionsbank von 2,8 Mrd. € oder entsprechend € 400 Millionen als „Beihilfeelement“ gewährt 
werden. 
 
Festzustellen ist, dass die Existenz mehrerer öffentlicher Förderinstrumenten auf verschiedenen 
Ebenen Koordinationsprobleme und mangelnde Transparenz trotz der Bemühungen der Kommission 
in diesem Respekt mit sich bringt. Dieser Mangel an Transparenz stellt wiederum eine 
Herausforderung für die Quantifizierung staatlicher Beihilfen und der öffentlichen Unterstützung 
ohne staatliche Beihilfen für eine Branche oder für einen Sektor. Dieses Papier soll dazu beitragen, 
die politische Debatte über die Auswirkungen der staatlichen Unterstützung für die 
Automobilindustrie zu informieren sowie das akademische Interesse für staatliche Beilhilfen und den 
öffentlichen Transfer an Unternehmen zu fördern. 
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Abstract
We provide an overview of public support for the European car industry during the
past decade. First, we identify the most relevant instruments of public support, and
review their economic assessment. The European Commission increasingly recognizes
the role of economic analysis in controlling public aid to the car industry, although
the degree of economic assessment varies across di¤erent instruments of public support
and individual state aid cases. Moreover, the state aid legislative framework is open to
derogations and interpretations. In particular, the Temporary Framework, approved
by the Commission to tackle the last nancial and economic crisis de facto implied a
relaxation of the state aid rules and foresaw no formal control of individual state aids.
Second, we aim to estimate the amount of public support for European car manu-
facturers. Three factors complicate the overall quantication of public support for each
instrument: (i) the Commission does not scrutinize, and hence does not quantify all
public support measures; (ii) the available information depends on whether the state
aid is granted to individual companies or in the form of general schemes; and (iii) the
available information depends on whether the aid is granted in the form of a grant,
soft loan or guarantee. Our lower bound estimate of state aid suggests that the aid
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declined over the pre-crisis period, but peaked at e1.2 billion as a response to the last
nancial and economic crisis in 2009. Perhaps even more strikingly, this state aid was
combined with an unprecedented amount of public support granted through scrapping
schemes of at least e4.0 billion, and loans from the European Investment Bank of e2.8
billion, or an equivalent of e400 million of aid element.
In conclusion, the existence of multiple public support instruments at di¤erent levels
may create coordination problems and a lack of transparency, in spite of the Commis-
sions e¤orts. The lack of transparency in turn poses a challenge for the quantication
of state aid and non-state aid support to any industry or sector. This paper provides
a rst step towards informing the policy debate on the e¤ects of public support to the
car sector, and also stimulates the academic interest in the subject of state aid, and -
more generally - public transfers to companies.
1 Introduction
Public intervention in the automotive industry has a long and worldwide history. In Eu-
rope, this has translated into the transfer of public resources to the car industry, both from
individual member states and from the European Union itself, through a wide variety of in-
struments and institutions. The willingness to support the automotive industry has become
even more apparent during the last nancial and economic crisis, which severely hit this sec-
tor. On the one hand, member states have heavily made use of the Temporary Framework,
an emergency regulation enabling rapid additional state aid measures to address the excep-
tional di¢ culties companies have in obtaining and securing nancing, especially for green
investments. And they combined this with scrapping schemes to boost the local demand
for cars. On the other, at European level, public support for the automobile sector mainly
translated into large investments to develop cleaner cars through the European Investment
Bank. Despite the severity of the crisis, no major car manufacturer exited, and no major
restructuring through mergers and acquisitions took place, a fact which may be attributed
to these interventions.1
The e¤ect of public intervention in the automotive industry, especially during the crisis,
is subject to public debate and poses some di¢ cult questions. Does it have a distractive
e¤ect, whereby a radical and necessary restructuring of the industry is held back? Or does
it e¤ectively facilitate structural adjustments, addressing the multiplicity of market failures
to which this sector is subjected? Moreover, even if specic market failures are correctly
identied, are they addressed using the most adequate instruments? Or do governments
privilege some forms of interventions that can give more immediate and visible e¤ects, such
as state aid?
Against this background, it is particularly timely to present a global outline of public
support to the European car industry.2 We distinguish between two main tasks. The rst is
to identify the most relevant instruments of public support to the European car industry, and
1In particular, following the last nancial and economic crisis, only four assembly plants have been closed
in Europe: GM Antwerp (Belgium, 2010), Fiat Termini Imerese (Italy, 2011), Saab Trollhaettan (Sweden,
2011), and Mitsubishi Born (Netherlands, 2012).
2We focus on public support directly granted to the car manufacturers, and exclude support to the
upstream suppliers, the downstream distribution sector, the connected nancial sector and other ancillary
services. This choice is motivated by two considerations. First, the denition of how those rms are linked to
the car producers is not obvious, so it becomes more di¢ cult to provide a comprehensive overview of indirect
support for car manufacturers. Second, there is an inverted pyramidal structure of the car industry, with a
few large car manufacturers at the bottom, several rst-tier suppliers, a number of second-tier suppliers, and,
at the top, thousands of upstream third-tier suppliers. This has induced governments to grant the largest
part of public resources to the lead car manufacturers, with the intention of ensuring the survival of the
entire supply chain (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009).
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provide an economic assessment of these instruments. We identify nine major instruments,
and for each of them we discuss the main motivation, the e¤ects (incentives and distortions
of competition and trade) and the role of the economic assessment by the European Com-
mission.3 For that purpose, we study the state aid legislation and reports of the European
Commission in general, as well as o¢ cial public support documents and state aid decisions
of the Commission as related to the European car industry specically.
The second task is to quantify the amount of public support given to car manufacturers
through these di¤erent instruments. For that purpose, we collected a unique dataset on
public transfers to the car sector for the period 2000-2011 inWestern European countries with
a sizeable automotive industry, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. On the supply side, these countries
account for around 20% of the worldwide production and 80% of the European Unions
production. On the demand side, sales in these nine European countries account for around
25% of worldwide automobile sales and 90% of the European Unions sales. Between 1998
and 2007, annual car sales in these European countries uctuated within a relatively narrow
margin, between 11.2 and 12.6 million. However, in 2008 new passenger car registrations fell
to 8.7 million units.
Both tasks serve the ultimate aim of this paper, which is to inform the debate on the
e¤ects of public support to the car sector, and also stimulate the academic interest in the
subject of state aid, and, more generally, public transfers to companies.
We can summarize our main ndings as related to both tasks as follows.
Economic assessment of di¤erent instruments to support the car industry First,
our overview of the di¤erent channels of public support suggests that the European Com-
mission clearly recognizes the role of economic analysis in controlling public aid to the car
industry. On the one hand, market failures a¤ecting the car industry are well identied
and constitute a justication of aid alongside with equity considerations. On the other, the
Commission has increasingly become aware of the distortionary e¤ects of aid on competition
and trade, especially with regard to regional and training aid granted to the car industry.
However, there is still considerable variation in the depth of the economic analysis across
di¤erent instruments of public support and individual state aid cases.
Second, the state aid legislative framework is open to derogations and interpretations.
The most evident derogation is the one established by the Temporary Framework. While this
3We do not consider any general economy public support measures (e.g. nation-wide scal measures),
industry-specic demand-side measures (apart from scrapping schemes due to their large scale and easier
quantication), public support for short-term work or any other employment support schemes during the
last nancial and economic crisis.
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was used to tackle the last nancial and economic crisis, it de facto implied a relaxation of
the state aid rules, in particular of rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid and aid for research,
development and innovation (R&D&I). The Framework has lacked clearly-dened objectives
and rules. In particular, there has been no formal control of individual state aids.
Third, at European level, loans granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) for
R&D&I projects constitute a signicant source of nance for the car industry and are sub-
ject to the opinion of the Commission. The substantial assessment of those projects is not
published, and the Commission does not have the same power to request additional infor-
mation from the granting authority, as in regular state aid cases. For these reasons, it is
not clear to what extent the Commission has the possibility to apply the same principles
of economic analysis expressed in its state aid decisions. Increasing the transparency of the
process would be recommendable, due to the large amounts at stake and the importance and
particular value of innovation in this industry.
Fourth, many European countries have introduced large-scale scrapping programs as an
economic stimulus to increase market demand within the automotive sector during the crisis.
The programs are not subject to notication requirements of the Commission with regard
to state aid. However, since they are based on technical specications, the Commission
has to be notied at the draft stage. The Commission has the right to issue comments on
the technical specications where the scal and nancial incentives can potentially hinder
trade in the internal market. However, there is no formal compatibility assessment of the
scrapping schemes. The Commission also does not carry out any ex-post evaluation of the
schemes regarding their potential distortionary e¤ects on competition and trade. Such ex-
post evaluation could be advisable, given the large amounts of public money spent in the form
of scrapping subsidies that bring large nancial benets to the car producers, and from which
particularly domestic producers could benet if the incentives are linked to environmental
eligibility criteria.
In conclusion, the existence of multiple public support instruments at di¤erent levels
may create coordination problems and a lack of transparency, in spite of the e¤orts of the
Commission in this respect. In general, worldwide international coordination across countries
to reduce overcapacity in the world clearly failed during the crisis. It is an open question
as to whether the Commission managed to coordinate these instruments at least within the
European Union. The cases of France and Germany, where national car manufacturers were
largely favored during the crisis, seem to suggest a negative answer, although we recognize
the role of the Commission in limiting subsidy races between countries.
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Quantication of public support to the car industry The quantication of the state
aid element for each channel of public support is a challenging task due to three major
factors. First, only if the European Commission scrutinizes a public support measure, will
it also clearly quantify the state aid element. Second, regarding the public support that
is scrutinized by the Commission, the availability of information on the state aid element
depends on whether this is an aid granted to individual companies (ad hoc aid), or an
aid granted in the form of schemes to multiple companies. Accordingly, there are di¤erent
sources of information that need to be analyzed and put together. Third, the quantication
of the aid element depends to a considerable extent on whether the aid is granted in the
form of a direct grant, soft loan or guarantee.
Because of these challenges, we rst quantify the state aid element by the instrument of
public support whenever this is possible. We then sum up those aid elements that we can
estimate consistently to quantify the overall amount of state aid granted to the European car
industry. We pursue this strategy for state aid support instruments, i.e. aid under General
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), regional aid, training aid, Research and Development
and Investment (R&D&I) aid, Rescue and Restructuring (R&R) aid and aid to remedy a
serious disturbance in the economy as approved under the Temporary Framework.
Non-state aid support instruments, such as loans of the European Investment Bank, social
public support and scrapping programs, do not fall under the formal scrutiny of the European
Commission. Hence, there is no economic compatibility assessment of those instruments as
in the case of state aid support, and the aid element is not quantied. We therefore report
the amounts of public support granted under each instrument of the non-state aid support
separately.
As related to the state aid support, we nd that regional aid was granted extensively to the
European car industry over the decade prior to the crisis, followed by training aid. R&D&I
aid and R&R aid were rarely granted to the car sector. None of those aid instruments
were used extensively during the last nancial and economic crisis: At that time the aid
was primarily granted under the Temporary Framework. The table below summarizes our
quantication of public support granted to the European car industry over the last decade.
Our lower bound estimate of state aid shows that the state aid to the European car industry
declined over the last decade, but peaked in response to the crisis under the Temporary
Framework in 2009. The total state aid declined in 2010 and 2011 to an even lower level
than the average pre-crisis level.
As related to the non-state aid support, we nd the following: First, the loans of the
European Investment Bank were granted in large amounts to the European car industry
before the crisis and increased substantially during the crisis. Second, the amounts of social
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Summary of quantication of public support for the European car industry
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
State aid support instrument
GBER 3.80 3.80
Regional aid 46.04 302.92 590.12 78.52 26.54 106.37 7.40 89.27 15.82 51.37 1,314.36
Training aid 19.72 2.65 54.57 4.57 14.22 5.55 23.19 14.68 17.09 156.24
R&R aid 6.50 6.50
Temporary 1,125.00 96.80 1,221.80
Framework
Tot. by year 46.04 322.64 592.77 133.08 31.11 127.09 12.95 23.19 14.68 1,214.27 112.62 68.46 2,698.90
Per unit of 2.86 19.89 37.00 8.37 1.96 8.18 0.85 1.48 1.04 104.16 8.67 5.27 15.13
production (e)
Non-state aid support instrument
EIB loans 525.00 845.00 400.00 580.00 550.00 245.00 697.00 750.00 650.00 2,800.00 2,822.00 1195.00 12,059.00
aid element 78.75 126.75 60.00 87.00 82.50 36.75 104.55 112.50 97.50 420.00 423.30 179.25 1,808.85
EGF support 4.80 15.10 4.30 52.50 76.70
Scrapping 19.19 4,057.17 1,334.90 12.00 5,423.26
schemes
Source: own estimations. This table reports the quantication of the public support for the European car sector
for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. State aid support is expressed as gross grant equivalent in present value and relative to the
units of production. Non-state aid support is expressed in nominal value. Empty cells mean no relevant public
support was awarded in those years.
Our estimates are based on the following major assumptions:
(i) State aid support: Estimates reect planned aid amounts collected from the Commissions decisions published
in the state aid register. They do not generally include the aid granted in the form of schemes unless (i) the aid
is notied individually under the approved scheme to the Commission and the respective decision is published
in the register, or (ii) we can infer the information on the granted aid amounts from the Commissions reports
published ex post as in the Temporary Framework case. We also do not include the aid amounts published
under the Transparency systemof the Commission for regional aid and R&D&I aid that reect the actual
aid amounts.
(ii) Non-state aid support: An aid elementin case of the EIB loans is quantied as 15% of the nominal value
of the loans granted. Scrapping schemes cover France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the amounts
reect government budgets.
For detailed explanation of the assumptions behind our estimates, see paragraph 4.12.
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public support, in particular through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, went up
during the crisis to ease the consequences of the restructuring process in the European car
industry. Third, many European countries have introduced large-scale scrapping programs
as an economic stimulus to increase market demand within the automotive sector during the
crisis.
The state aid granted to the European car sector in the crisis peak of 2009 (e1.2 billion) is
consequently much lower than the nancial benets received by the European car producers
through the scrapping programs (at least e4.0 billion) and through the loans of the European
Investment Bank (e2.8 billion of loans in each year of 2009 and 2010, which corresponds
to an estimated e400 million of aid element in each year). Quantifying and analyzing
only the state aid would considerably underestimate the extent of public intervention in the
European car industry during the last nancial and economic crisis.
In conclusion, the overall amount of state aid to the car industry at the national level
or eventually at the European level is di¢ cult to quantify. This poses a great dilemma
particularly if one aims to understand how much state aid the European carmakers receive
in each country or in total across Europe, and how that aid has evolved over time, or if one
wishes to infer whether some industries are favored over others and how a decades orientation
towards horizontal aid is implemented in practice. We recognize that it is not the aim of
the Commission to monitor every single aid granted to any company (which would pose a
huge administrative burden). However, we recommend more transparency and clarity on the
side of the Commission in the process of notifying (ex-ante) and reporting/monitoring (ex-
post) the state aid and the existence of various sources of information on state aid support.
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider non-state aid support to obtain a more complete
picture of public interventions in any industry or sector of the economy, and to evaluate the
extent of protectionism during economic recessions (which may be especially distortive as
the necessary restructuring of the industry could potentially be held back).
Contribution to the policy debate Our overview of public support to the European
car industry and subsequent attempt to quantify it is timely for two related reasons. First,
during the crisis every government and the European Union as a whole has intervened in
the car market in some way. Subsequently, it is important to understand to what extent
these clearly sectoral interventions have reversed a decades orientation towards horizontal
aid, i.e. to benet all sectors of the economy. While state aid schemes under the Temporary
Framework were formally compliant with the requirement of horizontal application, some
member states have in practice used it to target solely the automotive sector (European
Commission, 2011).
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Second, there is a handful of studies analyzing and quantifying the di¤erent instruments
of public support available to the car industry, but these studies only focus on a selected
number of instruments and cover a limited period without giving a complete overview. A
few studies focus on the 2008 crisis and provide an overview of the di¤erent channels and
levels of public support to the automotive sector, namely Eurofound (2009), Eurofound
(2010), European Commission (2011) and Copenhagen Economics (2011). Sturgeon and
Van Biesebroeck (2009) also discuss governmental measures in the U.S. and Europe during
the last nancial and economic crisis, with a focus on the impact of these interventions on the
evolution of the global structure of the automotive industry. Nicolini et al. (2010) focus on
state aid between 1990 and 2008, before the crisis. They nd large and persistent disparities
in expenditure levels across countries, which they conject could lead to possible subsidy races
in recession periods, when public help is most needed.
The core of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a framework for the
analysis of state aid and other instruments of public support. We rst provide the legal
denition of state aid and discuss its compatibility with the internal market. Then we
illustrate the principles of the balancing test used in the economic compatibility assessment
of state aid and other instruments of public support. Section 3 provides an overview of
the instruments of public support relevant to the car sector. Section 4 presents a detailed
quantication of public transfers in the last decade for the relevant countries. Conclusions
are then given in section 5.
2 Framework for the analysis of state aid and other
instruments of public support
2.1 Denition and compatibility of state aid
Denition Public support to companies is subject to legislative control. The European
Union has established a set of rules to prevent public support to certain sectors and activities
distorting competition and trade in the common market. According to article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)4, public support should meet four
conditions to be classied as state aid and be subject to state aid control by the Commission:
1. transfer of state resources to companies: aid must be granted by national, regional, or
local authorities, or by a private or public intermediary delegated by the state;
4Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107, 2010 O.J. C
83/91.
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2. granting of an economic advantage: aid must favor certain economic sectors or com-
panies;
3. selectivity in eligibility criteria: the aid must be available only to a particular rm or
to rms that satisfy certain criteria regarding turnover, employment, ownership, etc.;
4. impact on competition and trade: the aid must be liable to potentially distort compe-
tition and a¤ect trade.
If public support measures do not meet all four of the above conditions, they do not
constitute state aid and article 107(1) does not prohibit them. For example, general measures
that are open to all companies, such as scrapping schemes to stimulate car purchases, do
not constitute state aid. In contrast, if public support measures meet all four of the above
conditions, they constitute state aid and are, in principle, illegal and prohibited under article
107(1).
Compatibility Article 107(3) identies a number of derogations under which state aid
measures can be declared compatible at the discretion of the Commission. As related to
the car sector, these derogations cover aid for economic development of areas with low
standards/serious unemployment (article 107(3)(a)), projects of common European interest
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy (article 107(3)(b)) and development of
certain economic activities/areas (article 107(3)(c)). Generally article 107(3) constitutes the
basis for soft law provisions that give a practical application to these general principles.5
This secondary legislation is composed of the Notices, Communications, Guidelines and
Frameworks regulating aid for regional, training, R&D&I, environmental and other purposes.
To assess the compatibility of state aid, the Commission carries out an economic assess-
ment in which the benecial e¤ects of state aid are weighted against its adverse e¤ects on
competition and trade. This exercise has been formulated as a balancing test. The test
involves three steps (European Commission, 2008):
1. Does the state aid measure address a market failure or other objective of common
interest (e.g. regional and social cohesion, employment, etc.)?
2. Is the aid measure well designed? In particular, is there an incentive e¤ect, i.e. does
the aid change the behavior of the recipient?
3. Are distortions of competition and trade limited so that the overall balance is positive?
5Soft law provisions are rules of conduct that are not legally binding, but which may have practical e¤ects,
for example in the court decisions (Cini, 2000).
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The balancing test was rst formalized as a conceptual framework to implement state
aid control using a rened economic approach in the State Aid Action Plan of 2005.6 Later,
the balancing test has been incorporated in the set of Communitys soft law provisions to
assess the compatibility of state aid. These provisions detail a set of conditions, for example
in terms of eligible costs, aid intensity, or nature of the beneciaries under which member
states can grant state aid to companies. Consequently, in most cases the balancing test is
not carried out explicitly, but in terms of the predened criteria and the soft law provisions
are applied in a rather strict formal way (Friederiszick et al., 2008, Neven and Verouden,
2008).
In particular, a complete analysis of competitive distortions of aid is rarely done in
practice. Distortions of competition and trade are assumed to be present when the public
support measure is selective in terms of granting an economic advantage. However, this
formal approach to the assessment of the e¤ects of state aid on competition and trade
appears to be changing, and the Commission is increasingly required to carry out a complete
economic analysis to prove the existence of distortion of competition or a¤ectation of trade
(OECD, 2011). For instance, in the Wam ruling7, the Court of First Instance concluded that
it was not enough to show that a company is involved in intra-European trade to argue that
aid to that company would a¤ect trade between member states: The mere observation that
Wam participates in intra-community trade is insu¢ cient to conclude on trade a¤ectation
or distortion of competition, and an in-depth analysis of the e¤ect of aids is necessary.
We now elaborate on the three steps of the balancing test - objectives, incentive e¤ects and
distortions of competition and trade following Friederiszick et al. (2008) - in our application
to the car industry.8
2.2 The balancing test
2.2.1 Objectives
State aid may be justied by e¢ ciency and/or equity considerations. Increasing e¢ ciency
has the target of enlarging total welfare, while equity considerations are related to how
available resources can be redistributed along the welfare frontier.
6State Aid Action Plan Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 20052009
Consultation document, 2005 COM (2005)107.
7Court of First Instance, 6 September 2006, Italy and Wam SpA v Commisison, case T 304/04.
8For the general discussion of those e¤ects, see also for instance Nitsche and Heidhues (2007), Neven and
Verouden (2008).
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E¢ ciency From the point of view of economic e¢ ciency, public support is justied if it
corrects or removes market failures. We identify the following types of market failures as
relevant to the car sector:
1. Externalities. Externalities are costs (negative externalities) or benets (positive exter-
nalities) not transmitted through the transaction prices that are incurred by the parties
who did not agree to the action causing the cost or benet. Positive externalities re-
sult in the under-provision of a public good from a social perspective, while negative
externalities result in over-provision. We distinguish the following externalities:
Knowledge spillovers: Knowledge spillovers occur due to the fact that rms can acquire
information created by others without paying the transaction price. Such spillovers can
arise, for example, in presence of R&D&I activities as a consequence of the impossibility
to completely protect new knowledge generated by these activities, or training activi-
ties, as a consequence of employees moving across companies. Given the di¢ culties in
appropriating the benets of these activities, individual companies may undertake too
few of these activities from the point of view of social optimum. State aid can establish
a more e¢ cient outcome by nancing research and training investments.
Regional spillovers or agglomeration externalities: Agglomeration externalities are pos-
itive externalities due to the concentration of rms active in the same sector in a given
region. Following OECD (2010), we distinguish three types of e¤ects that can arise
from such concentration: (i) input sharing, i.e. attraction of input suppliers that lowers
all rmscosts; (ii) labor market pooling, i.e. attraction of workers with sector-specic
skills that reduces search costs for both workers and rms; (iii) knowledge spillovers,
i.e. a companys e¤orts in R&D&I may benet other companies as knowledge di¤uses
more rapidly outside the company through business interactions or labor mobility
across companies. Automotive producers and suppliers often tend to cluster where all
three of the above mechanisms are at work. State aid can be used to support these
agglomeration externalities.
Coordination failures and network externalities: Coordination problems between mar-
ket actors impede the e¢ cient functioning of markets. R&D&I aid, especially for
advisory services and innovation clusters, may help to solve coordination and network
failures when companies nd it di¢ cult to coordinate with each other or nd appro-
priate partners. In the car industry the collaboration between universities or science
institutions, car producers and suppliers (including lower-tier suppliers) is very impor-
tant for developing innovation.
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Pollution: Pollution is a negative externality that arises when producers or consumers
do not take into account the deterioration of the environment induced by their activities
and products. State aid, together with taxation and regulation, can be a policy tool
to address this market failure by developing incentives for producers and consumers to
invest in environmentally friendly cars.
2. Asymmetric or imperfect information. Asymmetric or imperfect information - notably
in capital markets - a¤ects the ability of rms to obtain nance. Interest rates could
be higher in the capital market from an e¢ ciency point of view because lenders do not
have full information on the degree of risk associated with a particular investment.
The incompleteness of the nancial market is relevant to the car market both from the
production and the demand side. From the production side, car producers may have
di¢ culties in obtaining nancing for innovative products. From the demand side, the
incompleteness of the nancial market can a¤ect the availability of loans to consumers
buying expensive durable goods such as cars. According to IHS Global Insight (2009),
between 60% and 80% of new European private vehicles are bought using some form
of credit. This problem is particularly relevant during periods of demand uncertainty
due to economic crisis. State aid can alleviate market failures in capital markets, for
example, support to the bank branches of car manufacturers, or scrapping schemes,
can address the incompleteness of the capital market for consumers.
3. Market power. Market power is a failure of competition which leads to prices that
are too high from the point of view of a social optimum. The car industry is a clear
example of an oligopoly, in which rms are the price makers and sell a di¤erentiated
good. There are a variety of reasons for competition failure in this industry, rst of all
due to the presence of increasing returns to scale in production. In this industry entry
costs are high, where the level of output is determinant to sustain protability. Car
manufacturers should price above marginal cost, because as marginal cost is lower than
average cost, marginal cost pricing would therefore lead to losses. State aid measures
can reduce market power through fostering entry in a market and creating competition.
An example is the Boeing case, analyzed by Neven and Seabright (1995). State aid
measures can also prevent exit of ailing rms. The event of exit can cause tightening
of an existing oligopolistic situation, with a direct e¤ect on prices and loss in product
variety whenever bankruptcy results in loss of business assets.
4. Frictions and other market failures. Frictional problems of adjustment to changes in
markets and, more generally, imperfect factor mobility are relevant to the problems of
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unemployment and regional disparity. These problems are important in an industry
which is highly unionized, geographically concentrated, capital intensive and charac-
terized by production rigidities.
Equity The outcome of the market process is e¢ cient, but may not be socially acceptable.
State intervention may therefore be appropriate for redistributive purposes. Regional, social
and R&R aid are examples of state aid motivated by equity considerations.
Equity considerations can have negative side e¤ects upon e¢ ciency in other words, there
can be a trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency objectives, or - vice versa - equity objectives
can promote e¢ ciency objectives or simply be consistent with e¢ ciency considerations. In
the rst case, redistributive policies may introduce market failures. For example, regional
subsidies can concentrate market power in the hands of the recipient rms, or create incentive
problems for regions that are rewardedfor not performing well.
In the second case, a redistributive policy can be an instrument for partially solving mar-
ket failures. Friederiszick et al. (2008) cite two examples. The rst is related to redistribution
policies between countries equally endowed with the same input factor, but with di¤erent
distributions, and imperfect capital markets. In this situation, a government redistribu-
tion policy may maximize welfare by replicating, at least partially, the market equilibrium
with perfect capital market. The second example comes from Besley and Seabright (1999),
where regional aid is shown to provide a correction for a bidding contest between rich and
poor regions to facilitate the attraction of regional investments in the presence of resource
constraints which would not allow a poor country to compete with a rich one.
2.2.2 Incentive e¤ects/crowding out
The existence of incentive e¤ects for state aid measures implies that public support is e¤ective
in changing the behavior of a recipient rm and does not result in mere windfall prots. In
other words, public aid should only be granted when it is necessary to achieve the objective.
The presence of the incentive e¤ect can only be identied by an analysis of the counterfactual
scenario in which no aid would be granted by the member state to the beneciary. In the
absence of incentive e¤ects, public funds may generate both negative e¢ ciency issues, due
to the social cost of subsidies, and equity issues, due to the transfer of taxpayer money to
rms that do not need aid. Specically, public support may result in the crowding out of
private investment, meaning the presence of public funds discourages private investors.
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2.2.3 Distortions of competition and trade
We analyze four distinct, but interrelated, types of competition and trade distortions that
are relevant to the car sector.
Supporting ine¢ cient production (productive ine¢ ciency) State aid may cause
productive and allocative ine¢ ciencies which can be harmful for total welfare. Lyons et al.
(2008) argue that in mature sectors such as the car industry, in which growth in annual
productivity surpasses growth in demand, only a small number of rms can be supported.
Relative e¢ ciencies and scale will determine the speed and order of exit. For example, an
ine¢ cient rm will exit rst, or if two rms have the same costs, the larger will decrease
its size rst. State aid may distort this natural order and allow an ine¢ cient business to
survive (or at least stay longer in the market) at the expense of those which are more
e¢ cient, or a large rm can maintain its scale at the expense of a smaller competitor. This
problem is exacerbated by the presence of overcapacities. State aid can give rise to market
structures that operate below their e¢ cient scale. The European car sector is characterized
by signicant overcapacities of between 20% and 30% (Eurofound, 2010).
Distorting dynamic incentives Distortions in dynamic incentives can be relevant both
to the recipient rm and to the competitors. In the rst case, state aid can introduce soft
budget constraintswhich reduce the beneciarys incentive to adapt to market conditions
or, at the limit, to behave e¢ ciently. In the second case, competitors may revise their future
investment plans because of the advantage that has been granted to the aid recipient. For
example, if a company receives aid to develop its products, this company can increase its
future presence in the product market. As a consequence, competitors can reduce the scope of
their original investments (this is another form of crowding out e¤ects presented in paragraph
2.2.2). Distortions of dynamic incentives are particularly relevant in the car industry, given
the importance of strategic interactions between the limited number of players in the market.
Increasing market power Although reduction of market power can be an objective of
state aid, as explained in paragraph 2.2.1, state aid can also create market power in the hands
of a group of rms, for example when non-recipients are forced to decrease their market
presence, or when aid is used to erect entry barriers. Governments are often criticized when
they support rms in their homemarket, especially those rms that often already have a
high degree of market power. Domestic rms can use these subsidies to avoid the entrance
of non-domestic producers, while resulting oligopoly rents can be employed to expand into
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foreign markets. The presence of market power is one of the two legs of the strategic trade
argument, which is elaborated upon in the next paragraph.
Distorting production and location decisions across member states State aid can
a¤ect the production side of rms, by inuencing both the location choice of rms and the
level of production/investment in di¤erent locations. In the car industry, state aid has often
been o¤ered to overcome the costs of operating in one location with respect to competing
locations, or to support a higher level of domestic production and attract foreign investors.
Therefore, government aid can result in distortions of trade ows and allocative ine¢ ciencies
across countries.
The strategic trade policy literature initiated by Brander and Spencer (1985), points out
that if rms operate in markets that are both imperfectly competitive and international 
both conditions veried in the car industry - then a government in one country can subsidize
its own economic activity at the expense of lost activity in another country. In other words,
state aid can result in negative international spillovers (which are distinct from the positive
regional spillovers described in paragraph 2.2.1), and cause subsidy wars. These wars are
caused by prisonersdilemma situations, in which every country competes with one another
in a game of individually rational but collectively wasteful industry subsidies, stimulated
by the prospect of poaching each others prots generated in the imperfectly competitive
markets. For instance, Röller and von Hirschhausen (1996) discuss the e¤ects of possible
rent-shifting between European countries due to state aids to East German shipyards and
synthetic bers industry, which could be ine¢ cient from a broader European perspective.
Strategic trade policy arguments are the crux for a supranational control system of state aid
in Europe, which can avoid those uncoordinated actions of member states.
These arguments could be valid not only at member level within the EU, but also at
European level with respect to the rest of the world. In other words, European governments
could coordinate to support the position of the European car industry to maintain such
economic rents within European boundaries. For example, the R&D&I Framework contains
a matching clause, which allows granting higher R&D aid when it is proven that rms
outside of Europe have beneted from more aid than they would normally be allowed under
the European state aid rules for similar projects or programs.9
International spillover e¤ects are complex to estimate, and it is indeed possible that
European governments try to collectively shift rents in favor of domestic rms, thus having
a negative impact on the world welfare, but a positive impact on the European one. Neven
9Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation at art. 5.1.7, 2006
O.J. C 323/15.
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and Seabright (1995) nd econometric evidence of these e¤ects in their analysis of state aid
granted to Airbus.
Implementation of the analysis of competitive distortions We examine three cri-
teria, which are strongly interdependent, to assess the impact of competitive distortions of
aid.
1. Procedural aspects. Aid can be granted in the form of schemes, which are open to all
rms of one or multiple sectors that meet certain requirements, or can be granted to
individual companies (ad hoc aid). Schemes can also serve as a basis for granting ad
hoc aid, which does not require individual notication unless the amount of aid exceeds
certain thresholds. Since aid measures granted through schemes are open to multiple
rms, they are assumed to be less distortive with respect to ad hoc aid. Accordingly,
compatibility analysis of schemes by the Commission is relatively standard: When
the scheme meets the conditions set in the applicable Communications, Guidelines or
Frameworks, they are compatible. There are two caveats on the approval of schemes
(de Cervin and Siaterli, 2008). First, the Commission carries out a substantial check on
discriminatory conditions which are not justied by the state aid nature of the scheme.
For example, the Commission does not allow the imposition of requirements such that
aided activities should be carried out exclusively in a certain member state. Second,
schemes should exclude granting of aid to rms in di¢ culty. This is the reason R&R
aid is always individual aid (with the exception of small and medium enterprises). In
the car sector, aid measures are granted both in the form of schemes and individual
aid.
2. Market characteristics. The characteristics of the car market are important to take
into account in order to assess the economic e¤ects of aid measures. Distortions are
more likely when aid increases asymmetry between competitors or reinforces a strong
national incumbent, but it can also help to avoid a tightening of an already concentrated
sector. Aid to incumbents can have signicant negative e¤ects when entry barriers
(with respect to both production and R&D) are high, since it can alter the incentives
for potential entrants. Aid can be especially distortive in the case of mature industries
and the presence of structural overcapacities. All those conditions are met in the case
of the car industry.
3. Amount. As a general principle, the larger the aid in absolute amount or in terms of
aid intensity, i.e. the aid amount expressed as a percentage of the eligible costs the
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higher the possibility of distortions and the more likely the Commission is to oppose
the aid. We elaborate on this issue in paragraph 3.1.
3 Instruments of public support for the European car
industry
3.1 Instruments of public support and classication
We identify nine major instruments of public support that are relevant to the European
automotive sector:10 ;11
1. Aid granted under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
2. Aid granted under the Regional aid Guidelines
3. Aid granted under the Training aid Communication
4. Aid granted under the Research and Development and Innovation (R&D&I) Framework
5. Aid granted under the Rescue and Restructuring (R&R) Guidelines
6. Aid granted under the Temporary Framework
7. Support granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB)
8. Social public support granted by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European
Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)
9. Support granted through scrapping schemes
10We use the following three terms throughout the paper: (i) public support (or support) to denote all
possible instruments of public support (which entails and does not entail state aid), (ii) state aid support
(or state aid) to denote the public support that entails state aid and is subject to the formal scrutiny by
the European Commission, and (iii) non-state aid support to denote the public support that does not entail
state aid and is not subject to the formal scrutiny by the European Commission.
11We do not consider environmental aid granted under the Community Guidelines on State Aid for Envi-
ronmental Protection (2008 O.J. C 82/1) as an instrument of public support explicitly in our analysis since
we have not found any individual aid case in the state aid register of the European Commission related to
the car sector. We identied one scheme directly related to the car industry (Commission Decision State aid
No. NN 56/2005 - United Kingdom Low Carbon Research and Development Programme, 2006 O.J. C 002)
that the Commission had assessed based on the R&D&I Framework. We discuss R&D&I projects aimed at
environmental protection and sustainable development in length in paragraph 3.5, in light of their relevance
to the car industry.
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Table 1 classies these instruments according to several criteria. The second column
distinguishes between public support measures that are granted at national (instruments 1
to 6 and 9) or European (instruments 7 and 8) level. The EGF funds are granted by the EU
in co-nancing with member states.
The third column reports whether those instruments constitute state aid according to
article 107(1) of the TFEU. Instruments 1 to 6 constitute, strictly speaking, state aid since
they fulll all four denition requirements described in paragraph 2.1. EIB loans and social
public support granted by the ESF and the EGF do not, strictly speaking, constitute state
aid since they are granted at European level and they do not fulll the requirement of state
aid being a transfer of state resources to companies.12 Scrapping schemes do not constitute
state aid since ex-ante this measure is assumed not to be selective, i.e. it is granted without
discrimination, for example, with regard to the origin of the product.
The fourth and the fth columns summarize when the Commission carries out a substan-
tial assessment, and which type of assessment is applicable for each instrument. Note that
even instruments that do not constitute state aid according to article 107(1) of the TFEU
can be subject to the assessment of the Commission. The depth of this assessment varies
and we classify it by degree: no assessment, standard assessment, or detailed assessment.
We present the degree of assessment in Figure 1. The gure does not report the EIB loans
and scrapping schemes which are not subject to a formal assessment by the Commission as
in the case of state aid. We distinguish three cases. First, when aid amount and/or intensity
is very low, namely in cases falling under the GBER, the Commission does not carry out
a substantial assessment according to the principle that distortions should be limited and
the balancing test should implicitly be satised. Second, when the aid intensity is higher
and the measure falls under the relevant Notices, Communications, Guidelines and Frame-
works, state aid is to be notied, and can be subject to two types of substantial assessment:
standard or detailed. If aid is granted through schemes and the aid amount or intensity is
below a set of ceilings, the Commission carries out a standard assessment, which is a check
on whether the aid measure meets the formal criteria set out in the relevant legislative text.
Third, if aid is granted to individual rms and/or the amount or intensity is above a set
of ceilings, the Commission carries out a detailed assessment, which generally follows the
balancing test illustrated in paragraph 2.2.
The Temporary Framework constitutes a derogation to the ceiling system illustrated in
Figure 1. Aid granted under the Temporary Framework is always subject to a standard
assessment independent of the amount of aid and whether it is granted in the form of
12In particular, the EGF funds go directly to the employees and do not entail state aid since they do not
provide an advantage to undertakings.
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schemes or as ad hoc aid. In the case of scheme, aid recipients are not known ex-ante, so a
balancing test is not carried out. In cases of ad hoc aid notied to the Commission under
the Temporary Framework, the Commission carries out only a standard assessment. During
the crisis, the Commission often resorted to ex-o¢ cio investigations, thus reversing a decade
of claims with regard to the need for transparency in the state aid control system.
In the fth column of Table 1, note that social public support granted by the ESF can be
subject to no assessment, a standard or a detailed assessment depending on the aid amount
and intensity. Support granted by the European Investment Bank in the form of a loan
is subject to the opinion of the Commission. The information on EIB projects before and
after their approval is absent or limited. The substantial assessment of those projects is
not published, and the Commission does not have the same power to request additional
information from the granting authority, as in regular state aid cases. For these reasons, it
is not clear to what extent the Commission has the possibility to apply the same principles
of economic analysis expressed in its state aid decisions.
With regard to scrapping schemes, the Commission issues comments on their technical
specications where the scal and nancial incentives can potentially hinder trade in the
internal market.
The above instruments of state aid (i.e. GBER, regional, training, R&D&I and R&R) are
granted under di¤erent soft law provisions. Since 1989, the car industry has been subject to
the Community Framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry13, revised in 1997.14
The 1997 Framework expired at the end of 2002. From 2002, the rules in the car sector were
included into the Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects15,
replaced by the current Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013.16 Some sectors
receive separate treatment under the guidelines, although the car industry now falls under
the general horizontal legislation of state aid.
Support can be granted with a main specic objective. For example, aid granted under
the R&D&I Framework is logically aimed at supporting R&D&I projects. However, support
can also be granted with multiple objectives that can overlap with other instruments of aid.
For example, aid can be granted for one project both with regional and training objectives.
Then it is assessed by the Commission under the Regional aid Guidelines and the Training
aid Communication.
We now elaborate on each instrument of public support. First, for each instrument we
highlight the relevant legislation. Second, we evaluate the relevance of each instrument for
13Community Framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry, 1989 O.J. C 123.
14Community Framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry, 1997 O.J. C 279.
15Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, 2002 O.J. C 70/8.
16Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013, 2007 O.J. C 54/08.
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Table 1: Summary and categorization of public support instruments for the European car
industry
Public support Level State aid Commission Assessment
instrument assessment type
1. GBER National Yes No No
2. Regional aid National Yes Yes Standard/
Detailed
3. Training aid National Yes Yes Standard/
Detailed
4. R&D&I aid National Yes Yes Standard/
Detailed
5. R&R aid National Yes Yes Standard/
Detailed
6. Temporary Framework National Yes Yes Standard
7. EIB support European No Yes Opinion
8. Social public support European/ No Yes No/Standard/
National Detailed
9. Scrapping schemes National No Yes Technical
The table reports the nine instruments of public support for the European car industry, classied according
to authority level, state aid element, applicability of Commissions assessment and assessment type.
the car sector. Third, we analyze the objectives of public support. Fourth, we look at the
incentive e¤ects. Fifth, we study the distortions of competition and trade. The third, fourth
and fth points clearly follow the structural framework for the economic assessment of state
aid and other public support embodied in the balancing test described in paragraph 2.2.
3.2 Aid granted under the General Block Exemption Regulation
Legislation The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) applies to cases of low
intensity aid, where the intensity is regulated by a system of aid ceilings.17 It covers numerous
types of aid, including regional aid, training aid and R&D&I aid. In this sense, the GBER
17Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible
with the common market in application of Article 107 and 108 (ex Article 87 and 88) of the TFEU (General
block exemption Regulation), 2008 O.J. L 214/3.
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Figure 1: Details on state aid control architecture and Commissions assessment
This gure represents the structure of the assessment carried out by the Commission for each instru-
ment of support granted to the European car industry (except EIB loans and scrapping schemes).
At the top are aid measures that are automatically allowed because of their low amount/intensity, as
represented by the allowable ceilings (indicated by the continuous line). When the amount/intensity
grows, the Commission has a set of allowable ceilings (indicated by the dashed line), below which the
Commission normally carries out only a standard assessment. Above those ceilings, the Commission
usually carries out a detailed assessment (balancing test) except for the Temporary Framework* (*=
always standard assessment).
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overlaps with the other state aid instruments listed in paragraph 3.1, but the di¤erence lies
in the amounts rather than in the purpose. Aid fullling the conditions set out in the GBER
is automatically considered compatible with article 107(3) of the TFEU and is exempted
from the obligation of notication.
Relevance to the car sector Given the conditions and criteria that aid measures should
comply with to be granted under the GBER, these are small-sized companies, namely au-
tomotive suppliers rather than car manufacturers, which are more likely to benet from
these aids. We nd several aid schemes in the Spanish car sector that are open to both car
manufacturers and suppliers (e.g. Plan de Competitividad Sector Automoción18).
Objectives The aids granted under the GBER pursue various e¢ ciency and/or equity
objectives depending upon the type of aid. We discuss the issues related to regional, training
or R&D&I aids below.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out Incentive e¤ects are relevant for aid granted under the
GBER. The Regulation does not apply to aid for projects that the beneciary would carry
out under market conditions alone. For a large company, an incentive e¤ect is assumed to
be present if the project size or scope or total money spent increases signicantly, or the
project completion is speeded up considerably. Nitsche and Heidhues (2007) argue that the
amounts should be adapted to the type of market failure that is being addressed. Limited
amounts of aid can be insu¢ cient to e¤ectively address relevant market failures, and may
encourage the wasteful use of public funds.
Distortions of competition and trade Distortions of competition and trade are as-
sumed to be limited, given the small amounts at stake.
3.3 Aid granted under the Regional aid Guidelines
Legislation Regional aid allows the creation of new establishments in the most disadvan-
taged regions. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of article 107(3) of the TFEU constitute the legal
basis for assessment of compatibility of regional aid. These paragraphs form the basis for
the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 (hereinafter Regional aid Guidelines),
18Commission Decision State aid No. X 59/2009 - Plan de Competitividad Sector Automoción, 2009 O.J.
C 279/21.
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which stipulate under which conditions and allowable ceilings, for each disadvantaged region,
member states can nance investments of companies setting up in such regions.19
Relevance to the car sector Regional aid is the most common instrument of state aid
used in the car industry, especially in the form of investment aid to establish new car plants
or to extend the existing ones. One of the most notable examples is the large investment aid
granted to BMW for the construction of a new car plant in Leipzig in 2002.20
Objectives E¢ ciency objectives are relevant when granting regional aid. Specically, re-
gional aid can address market failures such as insu¢ cient provision of positive externalities,
namely regional spillovers (agglomeration externalities) and network externalities connected
to coordination problems, as well as presence of imperfect information (discussed in para-
graph 2.2.1). Regional aid can also tackle market failures created by imperfect factor mobil-
ity.
Equity objectives are the most used justications in the Commissions decisions to declare
the compatibility of regional aid measures. Granting of regional aid is aimed at encouraging
investments and job creation in regions whose socio-economic situation is below the EC
average (article 107(3)(a)) or below the national average of the concerned member state
(article 107(3)(c)).21
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out The analysis of the incentive e¤ects of regional aid is
one of the most important elements in the detailed assessment of regional aid awarded to
large investment projects.22 Member states have to provide a comprehensive description of
the counterfactual scenario. There are two scenarios in which the incentive e¤ect can be
proven: (i) a company decides to make an investment in the assisted region that would not
be protable at any location (i.e. investment choice), and (ii) a company decides to invest in
the relevant region rather than elsewhere since the aid compensates for the net handicaps
and costs linked to a location in the assisted region, i.e. the comparison of costs and benets
of locating in the assisted region and in an alternative region is made (i.e. location choice).
Location choices are usually analyzed while granting regional aid to car companies.
19Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013, 2007 O.J. C 54/08. For the period 2000-2006 the
applicable guidelines are the Guidelines on national regional aid, 1998 O.J. C 74/06. Competition and trade
concerns related to regional aid are discussed in the Communication from the Commission concerning the
criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects, 2009 O.J. C 223/02.
20Commission Decision State aid No. C 26/2002 - on the State aid which Germany is planning to implement
for BMW AG in Leipzig, 2003 O.J. L 128/12.
21The Commission has qualied this distinction in the Regional aid Guidelines in paragraph 3.2 and 3.4.
22Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid
to large investment projects, 2009 O.J. C 223/02.
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Distortions of competition and trade Since regional aid may inuence competition
between individual plants of a car company and competition among car companies that
operate in global markets as well as location choices of the car industry throughout Europe,
it can cause all of the types of distortions of competition and trade listed in paragraph 2.2.3.
First, regional aid can lead to a creation or preservation of ine¢ cient production struc-
tures, since it mainly serves to fund productive capacity expansions. Particularly aid granted
in markets characterized by overcapacity is likely to be problematic, as it may distort the
natural order of exit or consolidation in an industry, and strengthen the market position of
the aid beneciary.
Second, regional aid can distort the dynamic incentives of rivals. It may lead to capacity
reductions of competitors in response to the expansions of the recipient. Smaller competitors
may eventually be forced to exit the market. Moreover, regional aid may prevent foreign
competitors from entering the market.
Third, regional aid can strengthen market power of the aid beneciary. Regional subsidies
in the home market may foreclose actual or potential competitors.
Fourth, whilst regional aid explicitly serves to inuence the decision on where to locate an
assembly plant, it can generate an ine¢ cient location outcome when the aid is o¤ered solely to
overcome the higher cost of operating in one location with respect to a competing location.23
Ine¢ cient location choices can especially be harmful whenever regional aid is not combined
with other instruments of public intervention to improve the business environment in the
disadvantaged region through developing infrastructure, improving education and security
and in general establishing a more e¢ cient public administration. Distorting the decision
on where to locate and adding production capacity in one market may create a risk that
production and investment in other markets may be adversely a¤ected. This may cause
market failures, such as a loss of positive regional spillovers and network externalities in
those regions that would have been chosen for investment in the absence of aid.
3.4 Aid granted under the Training aid Communication
Legislation Aid to nance training for workers, to the benet of both employers and em-
ployees is granted under the Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the analysis
of the compatibility of State aid for training subject to individual notication (hereinafter
Training aid Communication).24 Articles 107(3)(a) and 107(3)(c) form the legal basis for
23This objection was raised by France against the aid measures o¤ered to BMW in Leipzig in 2002.
24Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for
training subject to individual notication, 2009 O.J. C 188/01. For the period 2001-2008, Commission
Regulation 68/2001/EC on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid, 2001 O.J.
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this Communication.
Relevance to the car sector Training aid is frequently used to support the car industry.
The European Commission has generally taken a favorable stance towards training aid in
the past. Recently, training aid has been subject to a more careful assessment, especially
in relation to the assessment of the presence of market failures such as underinvestment in
the training of workers and generation of positive spillover e¤ects due to training, incentive
e¤ects, as well as e¤ects on competition and trade (see for instance decisions on training aid
concerning Ford Genk, General Motors in Antwerp and Fiat Auto).25
Objectives Training aid addresses the market failure arising from under-provision of a
positive externality such as knowledge spillovers. In particular, we refer to underinvestment
in training which can occur for two reasons. First, enterprises cannot fully internalize the
benets of the training they o¤er to their employees, especially when training is targeted at
skills that are transferable between rms (i.e. general training). Second, employees may be
unwilling to invest in training if they are risk-averse, face nancial constraints or are unable to
signal the level of their knowledge to potential employers. The Training aid Communication
explicitly recognizes that training aid has positive external e¤ects (knowledge spillovers) for
society as a whole because it increases the pool of skilled workers and the competitiveness
of the whole economy.
Training aid can also help to solve market failures connected to imperfect factor mobility,
for example if workers acquire skills that allow them to become more mobile.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out The main concern expressed by the Commission in its
decisions concerning training aid to the car sector is that it wishes to avoid the allowance of
aid measures for an activity which the company would undertake in any case, even without
the aid, to the same extent (crowding out). This verication is particularly compelling
because car manufacturers put their production plants in competition with one another for
the production of new models. Competition between plants derives from two specic features
of the car industry: structural overcapacity, and improved exibility on the production side,
where production technologies have evolved such that a plant can more exibly accommodate
L 10/20, the so called Training Block Exemption Regulation (BER)is applicable. This Training BER
has been included into 2008 GBER.
25Commission Decision State aid No. C 40/2005 - Ford Genk, 2006 O.J. L 366/32; Commission Decision
State aid No. C 14/2006 - General Motors Antwerp, 2007 O.J. 2007 L 243/71; Commission Decision State
aid No. N 322/2003, Fiat Auto, 2003 O.J. C 284/02.
Bermudez and Galand (2007) provide a discussion of several training aid cases in the car industry in the
light of a more economic approach of the European Commission.
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the production of an additional model. Training aid measures could therefore distort this
competition by reducing operating costs for the plant located in the concerned member state.
The Commission has established the principle that the incentive e¤ect is present only for
training aid related to qualications which are not immediately required for the production of
cars (Pesaresi and Hoof, 2008). When training aid is associated with the production of a new
model in the plant it is not justied, because the production of a model is a normal feature
in the car market, indispensable to maintain market shares and protability. In practice,
incentive e¤ects are very di¢ cult to evaluate since they require a specic knowledge of the
di¤erent types of training activities.
Distortions of competition and trade Training aid is a type of operational aid, and is
often related to the production of new models or the establishment of a new plant, which
requires new skills and qualications for the workers. As such, it has a direct impact on the
level of variable cost.
First, with regard to the issue of supporting ine¢ cient production, given the operational
nature of training aid, this instrument of support is likely to directly result in severe pro-
ductive ine¢ ciency.
Second, training aid can distort the dynamic incentives of rivals in their timing plans of
new model introduction, since they may take into account the advantage given to the aid
recipient. Competitors may also reduce their own investment in training as a consequence
of training aid to a rival.
Third, training aid can result in increased market power, since it can inuence rms
ability to compete and capture market shares by nancing training for the production of
new models, which is a vital condition to maintaining competitiveness in the car market.
Fourth, training aid can e¤ectively distort location decision by inuencing the decision
upon which plant a new model should be produced, with a direct consequence for the output
level of each plant. The Commission, however, recognizes that, as opposed to regional
investment aid, which is explicitly inuencing location, training aid should not be intended
to inuence the choice of the location of the production, but only to remedy underinvestment
in training when the market incentive is not adequate.
3.5 Aid granted under the Research and Development and Inno-
vation Framework
Legislation State aid granted to nance R&D&I projects is assessed on the basis of the
Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation (here-
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inafter the R&D&I Framework).26 This aid is primarily justied on the basis of articles
107(3)(b) and 107(3)(c).
Relevance to the car sector While R&D&I is very important for the car sector, there
are no cases of large individual R&D&I aid grants to car producers in the last decade.
These individual projects are rather nanced by the European Investment Bank, which we
will discuss in paragraph 3.8. There are several cases of R&D&I aid granted in the form
of schemes targeting car companies (e.g. R&D&I aid to the car manufacturing sector in
the Community de Madrid27). The lack of big R&D&I cases in the car industry may
be attributed to the fact that the Commission favors approving aid for projects to fund
fundamental research directed towards increasing scientic knowledge in a particular area
while it disfavors granting aid for developing new products, when R&D gets closer to the
market and may thus become particularly distortive for competition.
Given the lack of published individual aid decisions, it is not easy to evaluate the recent
approach of the Commission towards R&D&I aid in the car industry. In the early 1990s,
R&D&I aid was not permitted to support modernization. The European car industry was
facing heavy competition from the Japanese car industry, with its innovative production
system. Bhaskar (1990) reports that the Commission helped the car industry by adopting a
particular denition of innovation applied to the car sector, according to which the operation
of a new system or process representing a signicant step forward for an industry could
be subsidized. Over time, the Commissions assessment of R&D&I aid has become more
favorable thanks to the increasingly signicant nancial requirements and risks of R&D
operations and the reduced likelihood that this aid will a¤ect competition and trade given
that aided projects are far away from the market.28 Some insights into the current practice
of the Commission can be derived from the description of approved R&D&I schemes.29 In
particular, the Commission evaluates whether the R&D&I programs have any distortionary
e¤ects on other European competitors or not, and ensures that such projects are aimed at
improving European competitiveness. Furthermore, the Commission checks whether they
nance investments that go beyond the normal business strategy of companies.
26Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation, 2006 O.J. C 323/01.
For the period 2000-2006 the Community Framework for State Aid for Research and Development, 1996
O.J. C 45/06 is applicable.
27Commission Decision State aid No. N 54/2008 - R&D&I aid to the car manufacturing sector in the
Community de Madrid, 2008 O.J. C 264/2008.
28Commission Decision State aid No. NN 56/2005 - United Kingdom Low Carbon Research and Develop-
ment Programme, 2006 O.J. C 002.
29Press release of the European Commission IP/06/1020, date: 19/07/2006. State aid: Commission au-
thorises aid scheme by the French Agence de linnovation industrielle for innovation-mobilising programmes.
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Objectives R&D&I aid is mainly granted on the grounds of multiple e¢ ciency objectives.
It tackles the problem of under-provision of positive externalities such as knowledge
spillovers, regional spillovers (agglomeration externalities) and network externalities (dis-
cussed in paragraph 2.2.1). Those externalities are particularly relevant to R&D&I, espe-
cially with regard to knowledge spillovers. There is econometric evidence that, on average,
the social rate of R&D&I exceeds the private rate of returns by 50% to 100% (Griliches,
1992). The existence of large spillover e¤ects is therefore one of the most obvious justica-
tions for the transfer of public resources to correct the di¤erences between the social and the
private returns on R&D&I activities. Economic studies suggest that subsidies for R&D&I
may indeed be welfare increasing (Takalo et al., forthcoming). Positive agglomeration and
network spillovers can also arise when R&D&I support funds are used to nance projects in
cooperation with universities and suppliers.
R&D&I aid supporting projects related to the development of fuel-e¢ cient technologies
tackle the problem of over-provision of a negative externality such as pollution. With regard
to environmental projects, a market failure could arise because lowering energy consumption
would reduce the operating costs of a car, and these costs not being fully taken into account
by consumers.30 In this case, the cost of an innovation which reduces fuel consumption and
emissions would not be fully incorporated into the price of the nished product, so a market
failure in R&D&I for environmental projects could be deemed to exist.
Finally, R&D&I aid can help to tackle problems of imperfect functioning of capital mar-
kets which arise in nancing innovation. This is connected to a reluctance of the rm and
the nancial market to invest in R&D&I, because of the di¢ culty in properly assessing the
risk prole of these projects.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out Establishing the existence of incentive e¤ects for R&D&I
aid granted to the car industry is not an easy task. The automotive industry is the largest
private investor in R&D&I in the European Union, with annual investments of over e26
billion.31
Following Zapata and Nieuwenhuis (2010), we can distinguish between incremental and
radical innovations applied to the car sector. Incremental innovations improve the perfor-
mance of established products. Alternative fuels constitute incremental innovation as long
as they require minimal innovations to the existing engines. Radical innovation refers to
innovative attributes and qualities that are signicantly di¤erent. Alternative powertrains,
30Greene (2010) nds that some studies show a complete undervaluation of fuel operating costs by con-
sumers, whereas the overall evidence is mixed and there exists no study on the European market to under-
stand how consumers value fuel e¢ ciency.
31http://www.acea.be/news/news_detail/automotive_sector_tops_rd_investment_scoreboard/
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such as electric engines and fuel cells, replace the existing internal combustion engine and
therefore qualify as radical innovation. In the automobile industry the product has not
fundamentally changed over time, which may be explained by the necessity of amortizing
large capital investments in the existing technologies. Radical innovation is likely to en-
counter resistance as it requires the abandonment of existing systems, implying large sunk
costs. Incremental innovation would use the existing capital investments, and would avoid
the replacement of the old technology. This can arguably explain the industrys reluctance
in embracing research in radically new products.
In conclusion, problems in relation to incentive e¤ects can exist if R&D&I aid is aimed at
incremental innovation, because these research activities are already carried out by several
manufacturers and do not imply a complete abandonment of existing investments. Con-
versely, R&D&I aid could have strong incentive e¤ects in situations of radical innovation,
such as alternative powertrain technologies.
The Commission seems to consider these issues in its practice. For example, in the VHD
case, the Commission expressed doubts about whether the aid from the French Industrial
Innovation Agency to PSA for the development of a hybrid diesel car, which would classify as
incremental innovation, could be justied. In particular, the Commission remarked upon the
fact that similar projects had been announced by competitors. Therefore, the Commission
considered the possibility of a lack of incentive e¤ect since the project could have been
implemented without aid.32
Distortions of competition and trade R&D&I aid can lead to all four negative out-
comes listed in paragraph 2.2.3.
First, R&D&I aid can support productive ine¢ ciency when it is awarded to ine¢ cient
rms. Consequently, it might result in market structures where players operate below e¢ cient
scale.
Second, R&D&I aid can distort the dynamic incentives of competitors to compete. The
car market is at the edge of a profound change, where the internal combustion powertrain
has probably reached its maximum development potential, and completely di¤erent types of
technologies could be developed. The support provided at this point to one competitor could
give a temporal advantage and hinder the possibility for others to protably enter future
markets. R&D&I aid granted to manufacturers can also distort the dynamic incentives
of suppliers, who are also actively involved in developing technologies to produce cleaner
32Commission Decision State aid No. C 51/2007 - Support by the Industrial Innovation Agency in favor
of the VHD program. The notication was withdrawn in 2008 after the formal investigation procedure by
the European Commission (Commission notice pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, 2008, O.J. C
189/14).
28
vehicles. Manufacturers may exploit their nancial strength to control new technological
developments, with adverse e¤ects on the innovation incentives of upstream suppliers, in a
situation where the balance of power is already tilted towards manufacturers (Sturgeon and
VanBiesebroeck, 2009).
Third, R&D&I aid can create or maintain positions of market power. It is of special
concern if the aid beneciaries can transfer their market power in the existing markets to
the future product markets. The Commission identies concerns related to market power
when market share is above 25%. The denition of market is crucial and not always straight-
forward, especially with regard to R&D&I granted to new products. For example, in a case
of announced aid to BMW for the development of electric vehicles, the Commission has ex-
pressed doubts (still unresolved) regarding whether the electric car market creates a separate
product market or is part of the total passenger car market.33
Fourth, R&D&I aid can distort location decisions. This is unlikely to happen at specic
plant level, since these projects are normally executed at global level in research centers.
However, the possibility should not be excluded for smaller-scale projects.
3.6 Aid granted under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines
Legislation Rescue aid is a temporary assistance provided to a rm at the verge of bank-
ruptcy to keep it aoat for the time required to develop a restructuring plan. Rescue aid
measures must comply with the one time, last timeprinciple. Restructuring aid is an as-
sistance granted to the rm on the basis of a restructuring plan to restore a rms long-term
viability. In the assessment of R&R aid, the Commission applies the Community guidelines
on state aid for rescuing and restructuring rms in di¢ culty (hereinafter R&R Guidelines).34
Legally, the R&R Guidelines lay down the application of article 107(3)(c), in the instance
of rms in di¢ culty.
Relevance to the car sector In the car industry, there is only one case of R&R aid
being granted; that in favor of MG Rover by the United Kingdom in 2005, on the grounds
of the limited duration of the measure, and the serious social di¢ culties that the immediate
bankruptcy of the company would have caused. The aid was supposed to have no negative
spillover e¤ects on other member states, due to the low market share of the company and
33We refer to a grant e46 million from the German government to BMW for the manufacturing of two
models of electric passenger cars, which is under scrutiny by the Commission. Press release of the European
Commission IP/11/875, date: 13/07/2011. State aid: decisions on regional investment aid for BMW,
Volkswagen, Globalfoundries and CRS Reprocessing in Germany and AU Optronics in Slovakia.
34Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring rms in di¢ culty, 2004 O.J. 244/02.
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the limited duration of the measure.
Objectives E¢ ciency considerations can play a role in justifying R&R aid.
First, R&R aid can have the objective of correcting problems of asymmetric or imperfect
information a¤ecting the capital market because those markets do not have all the informa-
tion to gauge the viability of a rm.
Second, R&R aid can have the objective of reducing market power in instances where the
disappearance of the rm in di¢ culty may result in a tight oligopolistic situation, causing
an increase in prices, and/or in loss of product variety whenever the assets of the exiting
rm are lost. Both higher prices and reduced product availability can have a negative e¤ect
on consumer welfare.
R&R aid is often granted on the basis of equity arguments. In practice, it is motivated
by the fact that the bankruptcy of a large manufacturer has signicant local impacts on
employment given the geographical concentration in this sector. In addition, other local
businesses may be a¤ected through multiplier e¤ects, given the forward and backward link-
ages of carmakers with upstream and downstream rms and, in general, with other sectors
of the economy.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out We qualify incentive e¤ects in terms of aid e¤ectiveness,
namely if R&R aid is successful in changing the behavior of the rm. Aid e¤ectiveness is
very problematic in R&R aid. In particular, R&R aid can just delay exit, as opposed to
preventing it, a result presented by Glowicka (2008).
In response to the argument that R&R aid can correct an e¢ ciency problem of imperfect
information in the capital market, Lyons et al. (2008) note that it is very unlikely that
a public body can have better information to make funding decisions, especially because
capital markets have a strong incentive to acquire information that the funding entity does
not have.
From an equity point of view, the e¤ectiveness of this type of intervention is also ques-
tionable, because R&R aid does not provide structural solutions for the general business
environment. In addition, Oxera (2009) nds that restructuring aid has a limited e¤ect on
jobs and activity, when compared to a counterfactual of no state intervention.
Distortions of competition and trade R&R aid is one of the most controversial types of
aid from an economic point of view. It can generate all the forms of distortions of competition
listed in paragraph 2.2.3.
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First, it can support productive ine¢ ciencies by maintaining the least e¢ cient rm on
the market and raising the costs of more e¢ cient ones. In a declining industry forcing the
gradual exits of certain producers, R&R aid can alter the order of exit, resulting in market
power for the recipient and ine¢ cient market structures.
Second, it can distort dynamic incentives of the recipient and the rivals. For the recipient,
R&R aid can introduce a moral hazard problem when a rm correctly anticipates that public
intervention will prevent bankruptcy. This evidently distorts the perception of risk for the
recipient. For the rivals, R&R aid can provoke the revisions of their investment plans.
Third, R&R aid can increase market power of the recipient, especially when it is granted
to a domestic national champion. Its dominance can thus be reinforced by further weakening
the competitive constraint that competitors can exercise on the aid recipient.
Fourth, R&R aid can provoke distortions of location decisions. Negative international
spillovers are likely to arise when a country grants aid to a domestic rm. As a consequence,
R&R aid can cause collective wasteful subsidy competitions among member states.
3.7 Aid granted under the Temporary Framework
Legislation The Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to support
access to nance in the current nancial and economic crisis (hereinafter Temporary Frame-
work) was adopted at the end of 2008 to address the consequences on the real economy of
the global nancial crisis that began in the summer of 2008 on the basis of paragraph (b)
of article 107(3) of the TFEU. The Framework was preceded by the European Economic
Recovery Plan in November 2008, which was already proposing a simplication package to
allow state aid through horizontal schemes.35 Given the exceptionality of the measures, the
Framework was limited in time and was to expire at the end of 2010, but was prolonged
until the end of 2011, subject to stricter conditions, in order to gradually phase-out the
crisis support.36
The Temporary Framework is open to all companies. The Commission acknowledges
that even healthy companies may not be able to obtain the nance they need in the crisis
circumstances. Thus, the temporary aid may ensure su¢ cient bank lending to those com-
panies and also provide them with nance to continue their investment into a sustainable
future, including the development of green products. Furthermore, the Framework can allow
companies that face liquidity problems due to the crisis to benet from the temporary relief
35Communication from the Commission - Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to
support access to nance in the current nancial and economic crisis, 2009 O.J. C 16/01.
36Communication of the Commission - Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to support
access to nance in the current nancial and economic crisis, 2011 O.J. C 6/05.
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in the form of aid. The Framework is, however, not applicable to rms that were in di¢ culty
before 1 July 2008. Such rms can apply for aid under R&R Guidelines.
In the case of aid granted under the Temporary Framework for the development of green
products, it may be treated as aid for R&D&I projects, usually subject to the rules of the
R&D&I Framework. Aid under the Temporary Framework to rms in temporary di¢ culty
due to the crisis can be read as a sort of R&R aid granted through a fast track in derogation
of the R&R Guidelines. Since the rms did not need to present a restructuring plan, this
aid could better be qualied as rescue aid.37
The Temporary Framework gave the possibility to use the following forms of measures:
 limited amounts of aid: a lump sum of up to e500,000 per company to cover in-
vestments or working capital over a period of two years to relieve them from current
di¢ culties;
 subsidized loan guarantees: the guarantee could cover up to 90% of the loan and
maximum loan could not exceed the total annual wage bill of the beneciary for 2008;
 subsidized interest rates applicable to all types of loans;38
 subsidized loans for the production of green products;
 a temporary derogation from the 2006 Guidelines on Risk Capital to allow e2.5 million
of risk capital injection per SME and a reduction of the minimum investment cost from
private investors;
 simplication of the requirements of the Communication on short-term export-credit
insurance to use the exemption that allows non-marketable risks to be covered by the
state.
From a procedural point of view, support is granted in the form of schemes, of which
member states must notify the Commission. Only some schemes contained an overall budget
limit. In terms of content, each scheme had to meet the conditions set in the Temporary
Framework for each type of measure. Once a scheme (e.g. subsidized loans for the production
of green products) had been authorized, ad hoc aid could be granted under the scheme
37The Commission argues that Despite that overcapacity, no major players exited the market during the
crisis and no major restructuring case was notied to the Commission. That phenomenon may be due to the
fact that the use of the Temporary Framework acted as a cushion in the most critical moments and the loans
and guarantees granted under the Temporary Framework in fact allowed some restructuring to be initiated
(European Commission, 2011).
38According to the R&R Guidelines, rescue loans should be given under market rates.
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without further individual aid notications. Horizontal schemes were chosen to speed up the
procedural issues and tackle the urgency of the crisis.
Relevance to the car sector According to the European Commission (2011), member
states committed e81 billion in schemes approved by the Commission, but only a quarter of
that amount was e¤ectively used. The most common measures were the limited amounts of
aid, subsidized loan guarantees and subsidized loans. Germany and France have approved
schemes covering all the measures under the Temporary Framework.
Although the Temporary Framework was implemented through horizontal schemes, some
member states, namely France and Germany, have in practice used it to support their au-
tomotive sector. In particular, the Commission intervened on the implementation of the
schemes in France for Peugeot and Renault and Germany for Opel. For the French case,
the Commission requested the removal of the initial requirement that aided rms could not
move their activities outside of France or prioritize France-based suppliers.39 The aim of
Commissions intervention was to avoid a return to protectionism in member states.
For the German case, the Commission intervened ex-o¢ cio in the negotiations between
the German government and the carmaker GM, which was requesting additional public aid
for Opel restructuring, not only from the German government, but also from other member
states such as Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom to subsidize further restructuring
after the company had obtained a e1.5 billion bridging loan from the German government
early in the summer of 2009. The aim of the Commission was to avoid a subsidy race between
countries to save the company and to avoid the approval of any measures with conditions
concerning the location of investments and/or the geographic distribution of restructuring
measures.40 GM eventually withdrew all requests for nancial assistance following the
refusal of the German government to subsidize further restructuring, and pursued its own
restructuring plan.
The Commission did not approve any o¢ cial decision for either of these two individual
cases. The Commissions intervention can only be followed through Commissions press
releases and reports released ex post (e.g. European Commission, 2011 and Copenhagen
Economics, 2011).
There were two ad hoc cases in the car industry that were o¢ cially notied and scrutinized
by the Commission under the Temporary Framework. Both were state guarantees at a
39Press release of the European Commission MEMO/09/90, date: 02/28/2009. State aids: the Commission
obtains guarantees from the French government on the absence of protectionist measures in the French plan
for aid to the automotive sector.
40Press release of the European Commission MEMO/09/411, date: 09/23/2009. State aid: Commission
statement on aid for Opel Europe.
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reduced premium covering 90% of loans granted by the EIB to Volvo and Saab in Sweden.41
The guarantees on the remaining 10% of the loans (that could not be covered by the favorable
guarantee terms) were provided at a market premium by the Swedish government rather than
the market itself. The individual notications were submitted for two reasons. First, since
Sweden did not notify any scheme under the Temporary Framework (apart from export-
credit insurance scheme), the Commission discussed the compatibility of the 90% of the
loans with the Frameworks provisions. Second, the Commission carried out a check to nd
an appropriate market benchmark because of legal certainty issues as regards the remaining
10% of the loan, and established that the latter guarantee really did not contain state aid
within the meaning of article 107(1) of the TFEU.
Objectives Since the Temporary Framework was essentially a fast-track to grant R&D&I
aid and R&R aid during the period of crisis, the objectives discussed in paragraph 3.5 and
3.6 apply here.
First, aid granted under the Temporary Framework is explicitly aimed at correcting
market failures connected to asymmetric or incomplete information, namely imperfect func-
tioning of the capital markets by ensuring su¢ cient lending to companies. The banking crisis
led to problems of risk aversion for the banking sector after the panic created by the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and the fears of a nancial meltdown. A credit squeeze can have two
e¤ects. First, it can create liquidity problems in the short term both for weaker companies,
such as Opel, and healthier companies, such as Peugeot and Renault. In addition, the dete-
rioration of the lending volume and conditions results in a reduction in successful acceptance
of applications for vehicle credit, with a signicant negative impact in terms of sales (IHS
Global Insight, 2009).
Second, the credit squeeze can cause problems for nancing long term investments. In
this sense, aid granted under the Temporary Framework has also the objective of correcting
underinvestment in innovation, in particular in projects that signicantly improve environ-
mental protection, caused by imperfectly functioning markets. This was the rationale for the
specic measure in the form of subsidized loans for the production of green products. It was
particularly appealing to the car sector, which is pressured to meet stricter environmental
standards. The subsidized loans to Peugeot and Renault were aimed at the development of
green products. The schemes to support the production of green products in Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom were explicitly linked to the automobile sector.42
41Commission Decision State aid No. N 80/2009 - Volvo Personvagnar Aktiebolag, O.J. C 172/2. Com-
mission Decision State Aid No. N 541/2009 - Saab Automobile AB, O.J. C 96/2010.
42Commission Decision State aid No. N 542/2009 - Italy Aid for the production of green products, O.J.
C 25/09; Commission Decision State aid No. N 140/2009 - Spain Competitiveness plan of the automotive
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Finally, equity concerns in granting aid under the Temporary Framework have also been
important, with the fear of the crisis spreading all over the economy, causing bankruptcies,
with their associated social consequences.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out The incentive e¤ects related to R&D&I aid and R&R
aid (discussed in paragraph 3.5 and 3.6) apply here. Given the particular circumstances
of acute nancial crisis under which aid was granted, we should partially correct the argu-
ment that capital markets have the incentive to provide nance if they think that rms are
healthy. During the crisis, loans to the real economy were substantially reduced and the
issuance of new loans virtually came to a halt between the end of 2008 and the end of 2009
(European Commission, 2011). In this sense, crowding out e¤ects are probably less likely in
this particular situation.
Distortions of competition and trade The distortive e¤ects related to R&D&I aid and
R&R aid (discussed in paragraph 3.5 and 3.6) apply here. In particular, with regard to
R&D&I aid, the Commission recognised that the subsidized loans for green products might
cause serious distortions of competition and should be strictly limited to specic situations
and targeted investment(European Commission, 2009). Overall, the crisis measures could
have led to the postponement of the necessary restructuring process in the car industry as
they have not provided an incentive to adjust the supply in response to the fall in demand.
The adverse e¤ects of temporary aid on trade should be emphasized. In particular, aid
granted under the Temporary Framework is especially likely to provoke distortions of loca-
tion decision. Subsidy races may have taken place both within Europe and on a global level.
Within Europe, most member states approved schemes and the Commission attempted to
correct the protectionist features of individual aid under those schemes.43 However, it is
not possible to ignore the features of local considerations in the aid under the Temporary
Framework, where France and Germany supported their national car producers, respectively
Peugeot and Renault, and Opel. The closure of an Opel plant in Belgium could be the out-
come of this subsidy competition, in which there was no coordination in capacity reduction.
At the global level, the intervention of Europe as a whole to save its carmakers appears
to support a strategic trade policy argument, stating that the industry was supported also
as a response to the interventions in the rest of the world. For instance, the US granted a
sector - Realization of investments aimed at the manufacturing of more environmental friendly products,
O.J. C 146/02; Commission Decision State aid No. N 72/2009 - UK Temporary aid for the production of
green products, O.J. C 145/07.
43Press release of the European Commission MEMO/09/411, date: 09/23/2009. State aid: Commission
statement on aid for Opel Europe.
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massive amount of aid to GM and Chrysler (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009). Support
to carmakers was granted also in Canada, China and Russia.44
3.8 Support granted by the European Investment Bank
Legislation The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the European Unions long-term
lending institution owned by the member states. EIB lending is project-based and long term
oriented, between 4 and 20 years.45 The lending portfolio of the Bank was equivalent to e84
billion in 2010, twice the level of the World Bank.46
The Bank uses its AAA credit rating to fund itself on the capital markets and nance
its lending activities. EIB loans do not incorporate any subsidy element, but the pricing
is attractive due to the AAA rating of the EIB and the not-for-prot status. Those loans
are also granted by a supranational authority, so strictly speaking they are not covered by
article 107 of the TFEU, thus they should not entail state aid. However, according to article
175 of the TFEU, the Bank should support the policy objectives of the European Union.
This article explicitly links the EIB with the Structural Funds (including the ESF). The
latter are subject to compliance with state aid rules. Moreover, article 19 of the EIB Statute
establishes that applications for nancing should be subject to the Commissions opinion
according to the general compatibility rules set out in article 107(3):
Applications made through the Commission shall be submitted for an opinion
to the Member State in whose territory the investment will be carried out. Ap-
plications made through a Member State shall be submitted to the Commission
for an opinion. Applications made direct by an undertaking shall be submitted
to the Member State concerned and to the Commission.47
The opinion is issued by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial A¤airs,
which consults the Directorate General for Competition to establish whether the loans have
selectivity proles that can distort competition in the internal market. In practice, there is
a check on the compliance of these loans with state aid rules, but this is an internal service
consultation. No individual notication or substantial assessment is published.
The opinion of the Commission is not binding. In practice, it is nearly impossible (and
hitherto unseen) that a loan is granted when the Commission delivers an unfavorable opinion.
44An explicit statement by the French President Sarkozy, as reported by Evenett and Jenny (2009),
supports this objective: The situation in Europe means that you cannot accuse any country of being
protectionist when the Americans put up USD 30 billion to support their automotive industry.
45http://www.eib.org/about/key_gures/index.htm
46http://web.worldbank.org/
47Statute of the European Investment Bank, art. 19(2). http://www.eib.org/about/publications/statute
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If that is the case, the Board of Directors may not grant the nance unless its decision is
unanimous. However, in the board there is a director nominated by the Commission who
should abstain in order to approve the loan.48
Relevance to the car sector The EIB has nanced the automotive sector for projects lo-
cated in less developed regions; for example, the BMW plant in Leipzig, which also beneted
from regional aid granted by the German government. This and other EIB loans to nance
the introduction of new models, or the establishment of new car plants resemble in their
purpose regional aid granted under the Regional aid Guidelines. More recently, EIB loans
are especially granted to nance R&D&I projects aimed at the transformation of the sector
into a more sustainable one (European Investment Bank, 2011). The support granted under
those projects resembles in its purpose R&D&I aid granted under the R&D&I Framework.
In addition, since 2009 the EIB has had a specialized lending instrument, namely the
European Clean Transport Facility (ECTF), providing funding together with the European
Commission. This Facility has been in e¤ect throughout 2009-2012 and was approved by
the Economic and Financial A¤airs Council of the European Union in December 2008 to
increase the lending to the transport industry in the economic crisis, and in particular to
support R&D&I investments directed at emissions reduction and energy e¢ ciency in the
European transport industry. Its yearly budget is equal to e4 billion and its target is not
only the automotive industry (manufacturers and suppliers), but also railroad, aircraft and
shipping industries. Given their purpose, the ECTF loans bear a certain resemblance to the
subsidized loans for green products under the Temporary Framework. The ECTF loans are,
however, granted to individual automobile plants and for concrete investment projects.
Objectives The general objectives of the EIB are established in the Treaty and can be
summarized in three points: (i) European integration and reduction of regional disparities
(article 174 of the TFEU); (ii) R&D projects to make the European Union a world-leading
knowledge-based economy (article 179 of the TFEU); (iii) support of sustainable development
to protect and improve the natural environment (article 191 of the TFEU).
These three general objectives have translated into three types of aid to the car sector:
(i) regional aid, where EIB nancing for automotive manufacturing is especially targeting
investments located in Convergence regions in the European Union49; (ii) R&D&I aid granted
especially on safety grounds50; (iii) R&D&I aid granted on environmental grounds to meet
48Statute of the European Investment Bank, art. 19(6).
49European Investment Bank (2011), at point 73. Available at
http://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/transport_lending_policy_en.pdf
50European Investment Bank (2011), at point 72.
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the emission reduction targets.51
The general discussion on the objectives of regional and R&D&I aid apply here, so we refer
to paragraph 3.3 and 3.5 for a detailed discussion. Furthermore, the EIB loans, especially
under the ECTF facility, could help to address market failures in the form of imperfect and
asymmetric information, in particular in crisis times which could hamper the access of car
producers to nance. Given liquidity problems due to the crisis, the EIB loans could improve
the ow of credit to car producers until banks resume their normal lending activities.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out The general discussion on the incentive e¤ects of re-
gional and R&D&I aid apply here, so we refer to paragraph 3.3 and 3.5 for a detailed
discussion, as well as the discussion of incentive e¤ects under the Temporary Framework in
paragraph 3.7.
Distortions of competition and trade The general discussion on competition and trade
e¤ects of regional and R&D&I aid also apply here, so we refer to paragraph 3.3 and 3.5 for a
detailed discussion as well as the discussion of those e¤ects under the Temporary Framework
in paragraph 3.7. With regard to trade issues, the EIB loans to the car producers may be
targeted to help improve the competitiveness of the European car industry compared to its
US, Japanese and Korean competitors and to keep a competitive edge when moving towards
a low carbon economy.
3.9 Social public support granted by the European Social Fund
and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
Legislation The European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Globalisation Adjustment
Fund (EGF) are two European programs aimed at improving employment opportunities
for workers and minimizing social costs of industry restructuring. The ESF is nanced
through European funds, but that funding can constitute state aid once it comes under the
control of member states. Therefore, the ESF funds are subject to the same notication
requirements and substantial assessment as regular state aid when the amounts are above
the applicable thresholds. It is the responsibility of the managing authorities to make sure
that this requirement is fullled (European Commission, 2008).
The EGF projects are funded by the EU in co-nancing with member states. To receive
EGF nancing, member states should submit applications to the Commission.52 The assis-
51European Investment Bank (2011), at point 73.
52The exact application procedure is described in Regulation (EC) No. 1927/2006 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment
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tance is given directly via member states to workers, and not to enterprises. The EGF funds
are not meant to nance the restructuring of companies or sectors.
Relevance to the car sector Both instruments were used during the crisis to mitigate
its negative social e¤ects in the European car industry. In particular, the ESF was used
to (i) support short-term workers by nancing training and a part of wage and non-wage
labor costs, (ii) support company and sector restructuring, (iii) nance retraining and (iv)
anticipate change requirements and match skills. The ESF had already been used before the
crisis to support restructuring within the automotive industry.53
Member states also applied for co-nancing of active social protection measures from the
EGF in order to support workers who lost their jobs as a result of the economic crisis. The
Commission revised the EGF rules to intervene more rapidly in the car sector to co-nance
training and job placements for workers made redundant or to keep skilled workers in the
labor market.54
Objectives The relevance of social support in the car industry is mainly related to the
nancing of training. Therefore, the objectives illustrated for training aid in paragraph 3.4
are relevant. Furthermore, the ESF funds can be used to ease the e¤ects of the restructuring
process in the European car industry or the EGF funds can be used to respond to an emer-
gency or crisis situation, and may thus be rather driven by equity considerations, especially
if those funds are used to alleviate the social consequences of plant closures.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out Since the social support in the car industry is mainly
related to the nancing of training, the incentive e¤ects illustrated for training aid in para-
graph 3.4 are relevant.
Given the limited amounts granted by the European social funds to the car sector, the
critique illustrated in paragraph 3.2 for aid granted under the GBER applies. Limited
amounts of aid can be insu¢ cient to e¤ectively address relevant market failures, and may
encourage the wasteful use of public funds.
Distortions of competition and trade The relevance of social support in the car indus-
try is mainly related to the nancing of training. Therefore, the distortions of competition
Fund, 2006 O.J. L 406/1.
53Communication from the Commission - Responding to the crisis in the European automotive industry
COM/2009/0104 nal (hereinafter Car Communication).
54Regulation (EC) No. 546/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 amending
Regulation (EC) No. 1927/2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, 2009 O.J. L
167/26.
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and trade illustrated for training aid in paragraph 3.4 are relevant.
In general, distortions of competition are moderate given the limited amounts. But a word
of caution is warranted on the statement of the Commission, who proposes these instruments
to retain jobs and combat unemployment in the automotive industry.55 As underlined by
Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck (2009), there is no reason to maintain employment in a
single industry. Falling unemployment in the automotive industry is also the expression of
competitive dynamics. The Commission should help automotive workers to nd jobs in other
sectors rather than support a specic one. However, this critique is mainly true for some
ESF projects, whereas the EGF nancing and part of the ESF nancing are totally aimed
at re-training workers and helping them to nd new employment.
3.10 Support granted through scrapping schemes
Legislation Scrapping schemes are government programs to promote the replacement of
old vehicles with new and more environmentally friendly ones. The Car Communication -
Annex 3, Guidance on scrapping schemes for vehicles, summarizes the policy of the European
Commission towards scrapping schemes.
Scrapping schemes do not raise state aid concerns as long as they are non-discriminatory,
i.e. open to all undertakings active in a member state. In practice, these schemes should
avoid favoring only the sale of vehicles of domestic manufacturers by including, for example,
car characteristics which could discriminate against similar cars coming from other member
states. Moreover, the schemes should be compatible with the relevant Community legis-
lation, in particular concerning type-approval of vehicles which requires, at present, Euro
IV emission limit values.56 As such, they are not subject to notication requirements to
the Commission with regard to state aid. However, since scrapping schemes are based on
technical specications, as they encourage compliance of vehicles with certain technical spec-
ications (such as CO2 emissions or Euro IV emission limits), they have to be notied at
draft stage to the Commission.57 The Commission has the right to issue comments on the
technical specications where scal or nancial incentives can potentially hinder trade in
the internal market. However, there is no formal compatibility assessment of the scrapping
schemes and no o¢ cial decision of the Commission is published.
55Car Communication, supra note 53, art. 2(d).
56Commission Directive 2002/80/EC of 3 October 2002 adapting to technical progress Council Directive
70/220/EEC relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles, 2002
O.J. L 291/20.
57Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a
procedure for the provision of information in the eld of technical standards and regulations, O.J. L 204/37.
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Relevance to the car sector Many European countries have introduced large-scale scrap-
ping programs as an economic stimulus to increase market demand for the car sector during
the crisis. Scrapping programs have been formulated in a variety of ways. In Europe, they
are mostly cash-for-replacement schemes, which require the replacement of an old vehicle
with a new one (or an old but more environmentally-friendly one) to be eligible for the
subsidies, but with di¤erent conditions on the duration of the program, the size of the in-
centive, the form of incentive (tax rebates, price discounts etc.), the age of the old vehicle
to be scrapped, and the environmental requirements of the new vehicles. Several countries
introduced schemes before the crisis, mainly with an environmental objective.
Objectives Scrapping schemes have a general objective of stimulating demand for vehicles
to support the automobile industry, especially in the crisis that was accompanied by the
worsening of condence and degradation of householdsaccess to nance. The introduction
of schemes can pursue e¢ ciency objectives, such as avoiding loss of regional spillovers and
unemployment due to imperfect factor mobility.
Support for the car demand can also have a macroeconomic objective of fostering aggre-
gate demand (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2009). Due to its strong linkages with other
parts of the economy and the overall importance for consumer and business condence, the
nal impact of a shock in the car industry on the broader economy is considerable. The ar-
gument is that if public support helps alleviate the impact of that shock on the car industry,
then aggregate demand will benet from that as well.
Since scrapping schemes aim to remove ine¢ cient, high emission vehicles from circulation,
they have another e¢ ciency objective, in particular with regard to the over-provision of a
negative externality such as pollution.
Incentive e¤ects/crowding out Di¤erent types of incentive e¤ects are relevant for scrap-
ping schemes. First, windfall prots arise when a consumer correctly anticipates the intro-
duction of a scrapping program and delays the purchase of a vehicle that he would have
bought anyway.
Second, scrapping schemes can result in an inter-temporal trade-o¤ or substitution e¤ect,
which arises when a scrapping incentive induces sales of vehicles that would otherwise have
occurred in the near future: i.e. car sales today at the expense of car sales in the future
(European Commission, 2009 and Cooper et al., 2010). A consequence of this e¤ect is the
sharp decrease in sales following the expiry of the scheme. Both Adda and Cooper (2000)
and Schiraldi (2011) nd that the scrapping policies boost sales of new cars in the short-run,
where bigger demand expansions in the short-run result in larger demand contractions in
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the long-run.
Finally, scrapping schemes can crowd out demand for other durable goods. Higher car
purchases can come at the expense of other productspurchases, especially of durable ones,
such as furniture or electrical equipment, or used vehicles (European Commission, 2009).
For example, in Germany, many people who traditionally opted to drive a used car, under
the scrapping scheme purchased a new car for the rst time (ACEA, 2010).
The presence of all these e¤ects complicates the assessment of the e¤ectiveness of scrap-
ping schemes. The potential crowding out e¤ects may o¤set the macroeconomic benets of
the scrapping incentives for cars.
Distortions of competition and trade Scrapping schemes can cause distortions of com-
petition and trade. First, scrapping schemes can support ine¢ cient production, by favoring
ine¢ cient car producers that produce small-sized cars that happen to comply with the en-
vironmental conditions linked to those incentives or generally benet from those incentives
if they produce low-priced small cars.
Furthermore, scrapping schemes can impact trade ows and distort location decisions.
In particular, scrapping schemes are only attractive to certain models manufactured by a car
producer and factor mobility across plants is limited. Thus, scrapping programs may result
in uneven plant utilization. Some plants may be obliged to allocate workers on short-time
working schemes, while other plants may have use overtime to meet the increased demand,
as reported by Eurofound (2010) and by the carmakers themselves.58 If scrapping schemes
are de facto selective, they can cause subsidy competitions among countries, where each
country designs the environmental conditions linked to those incentives (e.g. in terms of
CO2 emissions) to favor domestic producers over foreign ones.
4 Quantication of public support granted to the Eu-
ropean car industry
4.1 Quantication challenges
We aim to quantify public support granted to the European car industry over the past
decade. Ideally, we would like to estimate the state aid element, namely the ultimate
nancial benet contained in the nominal amount transferred to the beneciary for each
instrument of public support.59 We would then sum those aid elements up to obtain an
58http://www.atgroupreport.com/2009/bilancio.php?lang=en
59See Scoreboard - Conceptual and methodological remarks: conceptual_remarks.html
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overall quantication of state aid granted to the European car industry. After that, we could
examine the dynamics of state aid at country and company level: in particular, we could
check both which countries tend to grant more aid and which car producers benet more
relative to the others. However, such a quantication exercise is challenging in practice for
three major reasons:
1. the degree of scrutiny of public support by the Commission.
The availability of information on the state aid element of public support is depen-
dent on whether a public support measure is scrutinized by the Commission or not.
Public support that entails state aid according to article 107(1) of the TFEU raises
competition policy concerns, and is subject to the state aid control by the Commission.
The aid element is typically quantied and published by the Commission. But public
support that does not entail state aid is not formally assessed by the Commission: The
aid element is not quantied. The information on the nominal amounts of non-state
aid support needs to be collected from the respective authorities that are responsible
for the management of public funds. For instance, for the loans of the European In-
vestment Bank, which are subject only to the opinion of the Commission that is not
published, one needs to resort on the (scarce) information provided by the bank itself.
2. procedural aspects linked to the instrument of support (denominated Case Type in the
state aid register).60
As described in paragraph 2.2.3, aid can be granted in the form of schemes, which are
open to all rms of one or multiple sectors that meet certain requirements, or directly
to individual companies (ad hoc aid). For ad hoc aid the aid element is quantied
in the decisions of the Commission, while for schemes the extent of publicly available
information on the aid element varies.
We distinguish three types of schemes: (i) schemes that fall under the GBER, (ii)
schemes exceeding the GBER aid thresholds, and (iii) schemes approved under the
Temporary Framework. Schemes that fall under the GBER are not notied to the
Commission: the aid element is not quantied. Schemes exceeding the GBER aid
thresholds are notied and scrutinized by the Commission. The decision is published
in the state aid register. The Commission does not usually quantify the aid element
but reports the total budget of the scheme. The information on whether the budget
has been exhausted or not is not published. Schemes approved under the Temporary
Framework often do not even contain information on the total budget.
60http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3
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Schemes can serve as a basis for granting aid to individual rms. Normally this aid is
not individually notied. The names of individual aid recipients under a scheme are not
known a priori. They become publicly known in three cases. First, when the scheme
contains the requirement that individual aid needs to be notied or when the planned
amounts of aid for individual projects exceed the thresholds specied in the scheme,
then the aid is individually notied to the Commission. Individual state aid decisions
are published in the state aid register of the Commission under the denomination of
individual application. Second, the Commission has introduced a Transparency
systemunder which member states submit information to the Commission ex post
on large state aids (not individually notied) granted to individual companies under
regional and R&D&I schemes. The Commission publishes this information on its web-
page in a separate register.61 Third, the information on individual aid beneciaries
under the approved schemes can be followed from the reports of the European Com-
mission or other publicly available sources, as in the case of the Temporary Framework.
A distinction should be made between planned and actual aid amounts. The decisions
of the Commission (regarding ad hoc aid and schemes) are always published in the state
aid register and contain the planned amount of aid that the Commission authorizes.
The planned amount may di¤er from the actual amount awarded to the companies
by the member state. But the register of the Transparency system (regional and
R&D&I schemes) reports the actual aid amount. Note that the state aid register and
the register of the Transparency systemgive information on di¤erent cases of state
aid: the extent and the direction of the di¤erence between the planned and actual aid
amounts cannot be inferred from the available information. Finally, member states
submit annual reports to the Commission, in which they report on the actual aid
expenditure. The Commission uses the information in those reports to analyze the
state aid evolution in the Scoreboard reports.62 The information contained in the
Scoreboard is too aggregate (it is not published at industry level) and cannot be used
in our quantication exercise.
3. the form of state aid (denominated Aid Instrument in the state aid register).63
The aid element depends on whether the aid is granted in the form of grant, soft loan
or guarantee. The Commission adopts the following set of assumptions to quantify the
61For regional aid: state_aid/register. For R&D&I projects: transparency.pdf
62See for instance Commission Sta¤ Working Document - Facts and Figures on State aid in the Member
States - Accompanying the Report from the Commission State Aid Scoreboard - Autumn 2010 Update
(COM(2010) 701 nal).
63http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3
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aid element for each form of state aid:64
 grants: the aid element is equal to the nominal amount of aid granted. The same
holds for debt write-o¤s, reduction of social security contributions, tax allowance and
interest subsidies;
 soft loans, i.e. loans applied at advantageous conditions: the aid element is equal to
the interest saved by the recipient during the period for which the loan is granted;
 guarantees: the aid element is lower than the nominal amount guaranteed. It is calcu-
lated as the di¤erence between the market price of the guarantee and its reduced price.
The aid is granted when a guarantee is given and not when the guarantee is invoked.65
In conclusion, the aid element is quantied in the following cases: (i) ad hoc aid (planned
amount); (ii) individual applications within a scheme (planned amount); (iii) cases falling
under the Transparency system (actual amount). When the aid element is quantied,
we use the estimate of the Commission, but when the aid element is not quantied by the
Commission, we adopt a set of assumptions that follows as closely as possible the practice
of the Commission. The next paragraph discusses these assumptions.
4.2 Quantication assumptions
For the quantication of state aid support to the European car industry, we adopt the
following set of assumptions to recover the aid element.
Assumption 1 We treat ad hoc aid and schemes in di¤erent ways. We cover all cases
of ad hoc aid (granted with di¤erent instruments and forms) because the aid element is
consistently estimated. In contrast, we treat schemes separately and we cover them in our
quantication in three instances: (i) when there is an individual application of state aid under
the approved scheme and the respective state aid decision is published in the register of the
Commission under the denomination of individual application, (ii) when the aid amounts,
granted under the approved schemes, are published under the Transparency system of
the Commission, and (iii) when the aid amounts can be followed from the Commissions
reports published ex post (especially in relation to the aid granted under the schemes of
the Temporary Framework). In all other circumstances schemes are not covered in the
quantication.
64See Scoreboard - Conceptual and methodological remarks at conceptual_remarks.html
65Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form
of guarantees, 2008 O.J. C 155/10.
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Assumption 2 We report the planned and actual aid amounts separately. The planned
amounts are based on the state aid decisions reported in the register of the Commission.
The actual amounts are published under the Transparency systemor in the reports of the
Commission.
Assumption 3 If the information on the aid element in the case of subsidized loans or
subsidized state guarantees is not available, we follow the practice of the Commission in this
respect when the aid element is not provided by a member state in its annual report on aid
expenditure to the Commission: (i) in case of soft loans, we take 15% of the total amount
of the loan as a proxy for the aid element, (ii) in case of subsidized state guarantees, we
estimate the aid element to be 10% of the nominal value guaranteed.66
If the soft loan was not repaid, we take the aid element to be equal to the amount of that
loan (e.g. in the case of rescue aid to MG Rover in 2005).
Assumption 4 State aid can be granted for a project with multiple objectives (e.g. aid
to nance regional investment and aid to nance training). In some cases the aid decision
contains separate information on the amount of state aid granted for each objective. In other
cases, when the information is not available, we refer the aid amount to the aid instrument
based on the primary horizontal legislation under which the aid compatibility is assessed (e.g.
regional aid if the primary legislative text used to assess the aid compatibility are Regional
aid Guidelines, or training aid if the primary legislative text to assess the aid compatibility
is the Training aid Communication).
Assumption 5 In cases where a state aid decision takes up several years, we attribute the
aid to the year of the Commissions nal decision.
Assumption 6 When the aid is paid in installments, the Commission requires that data
on the aid amounts are presented in the net present value at the moment when the aid was
granted and calculated before any deduction of tax or other charge. We also express the aid
amounts as gross grant equivalent in present value.
For the schemes approved under the Temporary Framework, the aid amounts are not
notied individually, so there is no economic assessment by the Commission. The information
on the actual aid granted under the Framework can only be followed from the reports of the
Commission published ex post. Such reports usually state the amounts in nominal value.
If the public authorities transfer the aid amount to the bank account of the beneciary on
66Scoreboard - Conceptual and methodological remarks: conceptual_remarks.html
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Table 2: Quantication assumptions for state aid support
Assumption 1 Cover ad hoc aid and no schemes unless individual applications of aid,
Transparency systemor Commissions reports
Assumption 2 Report actual and planned aid amounts separately
Assumption 3 Report the aid element based on Commissions assumptions
for various instruments of state aid
Assumption 4 Split up aids for the same project based on the primary regulation
under which economic compatibility of the aid is assessed
Assumption 5 Attribute the aid to the year of Commissions nal decision
Assumption 6 Report the aid as gross grant equivalent in present value
Source: own assumptions following the practice of the European Commission.
the rst day following the decision of the Commission, the nominal amount is identical to
the net present value. Since in cases of individual aids granted under the Framework the
Commission did not publish any decision and all the loans were granted at once, we assume
that the nominal and net present values of such aid are equal.
Table 2 summarizes the quantication assumptions related to the state aid support.
These general assumptions will be better circumstantiated for each type of state aid support
if necessary.
With regard to non-state aid support, we state the total amount of public support that
has been granted. In the case of EIB loans, we report the nominal amounts of loans signed
by the Bank. In cases of social public support, we report the nominal amount of the support
approved by the respective social funds, i.e. either the ESF or the EGF. In cases of scrapping
schemes, we report the total amount of government budget for scrapping incentives.
Our quantication exercise covers nine Western European countries with a sizable auto-
motive industry, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom for the period 2000-2011.67
For each type of public support, we describe the data sources, we quantify the amount
of the aid element based on our assumptions, or state the overall amount of public support
67We consider nine countries in our analysis, but in the tables we refer only to the countries for which we
nd decisions in the state aid register of the Commission, or information reported under the Transparency
systemof the Commission, or information on other types of public support from various sources discussed
below.
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Table 3: Aid granted under the GBER
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
Country Firm emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
Spain Ford 3.80 3.80
Tot. Spain 3.80 3.80
Per production (e) 1.76 0.12
Tot. by year 3.80 3.80
Per production (e) 0.33 0.02
Source: State aid register. This table reports the quantication of the aid element granted under the GBER
related to the car sector for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Amounts are expressed as gross grant equivalent in present value and
relative to the units of production.
granted, and we analyze the results. Following this, we give a summary of overall ndings
as related to the estimates of total state aid granted to the European car producers, and an
overview of public support instruments granted at country level.
4.3 Aid granted under the General Block Exemption Regulation
Sources State aid register and the Transparency systemfor regional investment projects
and for R&D&I projects.68
Analysis Ad hoc aid amounts and schemes that fall under the GBER are not notied to
the Commission. It is only required that member states submit a summary description of the
aid measure after its implementation. In the state aid register we identify several schemes
under the GBER that are relevant to the car industry. The largest of those schemes is State
aid No. X 59/2009 - Plan de Competitividad Sector Automocion in Spain, with an overall
budget of e800 million. We found only one ad hoc aid relevant to the European car industry
approved under the GBER in the state aid register (granted with a regional objective). Table
3 reports both the gross grant equivalent in present value for this aid case and the amount
relative to total production. Several training aid cases that fall under the Training Block
Exemption, which is part of the GBER, are published in the state aid register. We consider
those cases together with other training aid cases in paragraph 4.5.
Apart from this ad hoc regional aid case approved under the GBER and training aid
cases approved under the Training Block Exemption that are published in the state aid
register, further information related to the GBER is published under the Transparency
system of the Commission as specied in article 9(4) of the GBER. The article states
that member states have to provide summary information (i) on R&D&I aid whenever it
68Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/.
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is granted under an existing aid scheme for R&D&I projects covered by article 31 of the
GBER and the individual aid exceeds e3 million and (ii) on regional aid whenever individual
regional aid is granted under an existing scheme for large investment projects that are not
notied individually according to article 6 of the GBER. We identied several cases of aid
granted under the GBER schemes with regional and R&D&I objectives published under the
Transparency system. We treat those cases together with regional aid granted under the
Regional aid Guidelines and R&D&I aid granted under the R&D&I Framework that are
published under the Transparency system analyzed in paragraph 4.4 and in paragraph
4.6, respectively.
4.4 Aid granted under the Regional aid Guidelines
Sources State aid register and the Transparency system for regional investment projects.
The Transparency systemdatabase is related to large investment projects granted under a
scheme for which the individual notication is not required. Member states need to provide
the information on these projects to the Commission under point 65 of the Regional aid
Guidelines and under article 9(4) of the GBER. This database has been available since 2003.
The regional aid amounts published in the state aid register are usually expressed as gross
grant equivalent in present value. Whenever the information is available only in nominal
value, we transform those nominal values into present values using the average discount rate
calculated on the basis of the other regional aid cases.
The regional aid amounts published under the Transparency systemare expressed as
discounted net (after taxation) grant equivalent before 2007 and as discounted gross (before
taxation) grant equivalent after 2007. To convert those aid amounts from net to gross values,
we assume that only corporate tax is paid on the aid granted, and use the average corporate
tax for each country for our transformations. We also assume that the aid is fully subject to
taxation in the year it is authorized.
Analysis We analyze the regional aid amounts published in the state aid register and under
the Transparency systemseparately, since they report planned and actual aid amounts,
respectively.
Table 4 reports both the gross grant equivalent in present value by country and year and
the amount relative to total production by country and year for regional aid published in
the state aid register. We analyze the gures over time and across countries and companies.
Over time, regional aid has declined. Most regional aid was granted in 2001 and 2002.
This aid instrument was not used extensively during the last nancial and economic crisis.
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At country level, Germany is the largest granter of state aid. That is driven by a few
large investment projects in 2001 and 2002. These projects are related to (i) BMW for the
construction of a new car plant in Leipzig in 2002; (ii) Daimler for the establishment of a
new greeneld engine production plant in Kölleda; (iii) VW for the production of a future
D1-model in a new car plant in Dresden. All those investment projects are located in East
Germany. Italy is the second largest aid granter in absolute terms and the largest granter
of state aid relative to production. Aid is most frequently granted to the domestic company
Fiat.
At company level, BMW has been the largest beneciary of regional aid for the Leipzig
project, for which it received a loan from the EIB as well.
Table 5 reports both the gross grant equivalent in present value by country and year and
the amount relative to total production by country and year for regional aid published under
the Transparency system.
Over time, regional aid reported in the register of the Transparency systemhas also
had a declining trend.
At country level, Spain has been the largest granter of regional aid since 2003, followed by
Italy and Portugal. Spain has frequently granted aid to foreign car producers, especially to
Peugeot and Renault. Relative to the size of production, Portugal has granted most regional
aid, specically to VW.
At company level, Renault, Fiat and VW are the largest beneciaries of regional aid over
time.
Overall, based on both tables, note that GM Europe and Ford have received regional
aid in multiple European locations. Peugeot and Renault tend to receive more aid at their
foreign locations (mostly in Spain) than at home. VW receives aid both at home and
abroad, namely in Portugal. Fiat gets aid only domestically. There is no clear evidence that
European governments favor only domestic car producers. Governments support foreign car
producers as well, most probably to inuence their location choice and generate employment
for weak or underperforming economic regions.
4.5 Aid granted under the Training aid Communication
Sources State aid register.
Analysis Table 6 reports both the gross grant equivalent in present value by country and
year and the amount relative to total production by country and year.
The biggest amount of training aid was approved in 2003, when the Commission autho-
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rized several training aid cases. No training aid was approved in 2009 or 2010. There may
be several reasons for the decreasing trend in training aid granted to the car industry. First,
it may be linked to the stricter approach of the Commission towards granting training aid to
the car sector because of its side e¤ects, as discussed in paragraph 3.4. Second, this instru-
ment may not have been attractive to the European governments for tackling the emergency
of the economic situation during the crisis because of the formal control of training aid by
the Commission and related long-lasting substantial assessment procedures.
At country level, both in nominal terms and relative to production, Italy is a major
granter of training aid, followed by Belgium and the United Kingdom. The case of Belgium
is interesting because the country does not have any domestic car production. The granting
of aid to the foreign car producers may be motivated by employment issues.
At company level, the biggest share of training aid has been granted to (i) Fiat in Italy;
(ii) Ford and GM Europe at various European locations.
4.6 Aid granted under the Research and Development and Invest-
ment Framework
Sources The Transparency systemfor R&D&I projects. The Transparency system is
related to R&D&I investment projects over e3 million, which are granted on the basis of
existing aid schemes. Member states are required to provide the information on these projects
to the Commission under article 10.1.3 of the R&D&I Framework. This information has been
published since 2007.
Analysis Table 7 reports both the gross grant equivalent in present value by country and
year and the amount relative to total production by country and year. Several relevant
projects have been approved in Germany and Sweden. Those projects range from e3 million
to e10 million in value. All the projects are aimed at the production of cleaner vehicles.
There are no ad hoc R&D&I cases granted to the car producers published in the state aid
register in the period between 2000 and 2011.
Given the scarcity of the available information, we cannot perform an evaluation over time
or across countries. One may only argue that the R&D&I aid instrument is not extensively
used by the car producers, largely due to the reasons discussed in paragraph 3.5.
4.7 Aid granted under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines
Sources State aid register.
53
T
ab
le
6:
A
id
gr
an
te
d
un
de
r
th
e
T
ra
in
in
g
ai
d
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Y
ea
r
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
T
ot
.
C
ou
nt
ry
F
ir
m
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
e
m
il.
B
el
gi
um
Fo
rd
6.
84
5.
55
1.
54
13
.9
3
O
p
el
13
.0
4
1.
94
14
.9
8
V
ol
vo
5.
80
3.
15
8.
95
T
ot
.
B
el
gi
um
6.
84
18
.8
4
5.
55
1.
94
4.
69
37
.8
6
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
5.
90
21
.4
3
6.
30
2.
46
6.
89
4.
10
Fr
an
ce
M
at
ra
1.
25
1.
25
T
ot
.
Fr
an
ce
1.
25
1.
25
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
0.
35
0.
04
G
er
m
an
y
B
M
W
0.
45
0.
45
T
ot
.
G
er
m
an
y
0.
45
0.
45
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
0.
09
0.
01
It
al
y
F
ia
t
34
.0
3
4.
57
21
.2
5
59
.8
5
T
om
as
o
17
.0
9
17
.0
9
T
ot
.
It
al
y
34
.0
3
4.
57
21
.2
5
17
.0
9
76
.9
4
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
26
.5
9
4.
16
17
.1
3
21
.3
9
5.
58
P
or
tu
ga
l
O
p
el
2.
65
2.
65
T
ot
.
P
or
tu
ga
l
2.
65
2.
65
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
10
.7
1
1.
17
U
K
Fo
rd
14
.2
2
14
.2
2
N
is
sa
n
0.
11
0.
11
R
ov
er
12
.8
8
12
.8
8
T
oy
ot
a
0.
06
0.
06
V
au
xh
al
l
9.
82
9.
82
T
ot
.
U
K
12
.8
8
14
.2
2
9.
99
37
.0
9
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
7.
74
7.
99
6.
17
2.
05
T
ot
.
by
ye
ar
19
.7
2
2.
65
54
.5
7
4.
57
14
.2
2
5.
55
23
.1
9
14
.6
8
17
.0
9
15
6.
24
P
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
(e
)
1.
22
0.
17
3.
43
0.
29
0.
92
0.
36
1.
48
1.
04
1.
32
0.
88
So
ur
ce
:
St
at
e
ai
d
re
gi
st
er
.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
th
e
qu
an
ti
c
at
io
n
of
th
e
ai
d
el
em
en
t
gr
an
te
d
un
de
r
th
e
T
ra
in
in
g
ai
d
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
re
la
te
d
to
th
e
ca
r
se
ct
or
fo
r
th
e
p
er
io
d
20
00
-2
01
1
in
B
el
gi
um
,
Fr
an
ce
,
G
er
m
an
y,
It
al
y,
th
e
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
,
P
or
tu
ga
l,
Sp
ai
n,
Sw
ed
en
an
d
th
e
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
.
A
m
ou
nt
s
ar
e
ex
pr
es
se
d
as
gr
os
s
gr
an
t
eq
ui
va
le
nt
in
pr
es
en
t
va
lu
e
an
d
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
un
it
s
of
pr
od
uc
ti
on
.
54
Table 7: Research and Development and Innovation aid reported under the Transparency
system
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
Country Firm emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
Germany BMW 7.50 7.50
Ford 4.70 4.70
Daimler 12.20 12.20
Opel 4.50 4.50
VW 9.30 9.50 18.80
Tot. Germany 13.80 33.90 47.70
Per production (e) 2.87 6.29 0.77
Sweden Saab 5.60 5.60
Volvo 7.40 7.40
Tot. Sweden 7.40 5.60 13.00
Per production (e) 57.48 31.48 4.68
Tot. by year 21.20 39.50 60.70
Per production (e) 1.82 3.04 0.34
Source: Transparency system for R&D&I projects. This table reports the quantication of the aid element
granted under the R&D&I Framework and GBER related to the car sector for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Amounts are
expressed as gross grant equivalent in present value and relative to the units of production.
Table 8: Aid granted under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
Country Firm emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
UK Rover 6.50 6.50
Tot. UK 6.50 6.50
Per production (e) 3.65 0.33
Tot. by year 6.50 6.50
Per production (e) 3.65 0.33
Source: State aid register. This table reports the quantication of the aid element granted under the R&R
Guidelines related to the car sector for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Amounts are expressed as gross grant equivalent in present
value and relative to the units of production.
Analysis Since 2000 there has been only one instance of aid granted under the R&R
Guidelines, in the form of soft loan. This is the rescue loan to MG Rover, granted for one
week at a xed annual interest rate of 7.5%, which was higher than the reference rate for the
United Kingdom of 5.81%. As stated in the state aid decision, the loan was not repaid and
the United Kingdom had to communicate the liquidation plan. To the best of our knowledge
the loan has not been paid back, so we report the loan amount to be equal to the state aid
amount in Table 8.
4.8 Aid granted under the Temporary Framework
Sources State aid register and various reports of the European Commission.
The state aid register contains decisions on the general schemes notied by member states
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to the Commission under the Temporary Framework and two cases of ad hoc state aid to car
producers in Sweden. To collect information on individual aid granted under those approved
schemes, we rely on the studies of the European Commission related to the application
of the Temporary Framework (European Commission, 2009, European Commission, 2010,
European Commission, 2011) and on the responses of member states to the questionnaire of
the Commission on the application of the Temporary Framework.69
Analysis In response to the last nancial and economic crisis, European governments
announced their intention to support domestic car industries either directly by approv-
ing car industry-targeted plans of support or by supporting their car industries within the
broader plans to revive their national economies. The implementation of those plans in-
cluded demand-side measures of public support (for example scrapping schemes and tax
reductions), aid measures within the approved schemes under the horizontal aid legislation
and aid measures within the approved schemes under the Temporary Framework. We in-
ventory the relevant initiatives of the European governments that may have beneted car
producers and point out both the approved general schemes and actual cases of individual
state aid granted under the Temporary Framework for each country.
Belgium approved a general stimulus plan to revive the Belgian economy at the end
of 2008.70 It notied several schemes to the Commission under the Temporary Framework:
guarantees, risk capital and export-credit insurance. Under the guarantees scheme the Flem-
ish regional government approved a subsidized guarantee on the loan of INGBelgium to Volvo
Cars Ghent plant equal to e198 million in 2010.71 The loan had a duration of ve years,
with the objective of securing investments and jobs in the Ghent car plant.
The French program, denominated Le pacte automobile, was approved in February
2009 and contained: (i) a subsidized loan amounting to e6.5 billion to the domestic car
producers Peugeot and Renault and other car companies to deal with the nancial and
industrial crisis and promote the development of green products; (ii) a subsidized loan of
e2 billion to the internal banks of Peugeot and Renault; (iii) guarantees and funds for
automobile suppliers.72 France notied all schemes to the Commission under the Temporary
Framework. The loans to Peugeot and Renault (each e3.0 billion) had a duration of 5 years
with 6% interest rate during the rst two years, which could be raised to 9% afterwards.
In that period, the rather low credit rating of both companies (BB+) would have implied
69http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_temporary_framework/index.html
70http://www.belgium.be/nl/binaries/herstelplan_tcm117-29600.pdf
71https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/enhanced/en-gb/media/preview.aspx?mediaid=35852
72http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/le-pacte-automobile
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an interest rate of around 8% for a loan with the same duration in the nancial market.73
In return, the car companies were required to maintain their employment levels in France,
invest in green technology and not close any assembly plant in France for the duration of the
loan. Peugeot and Renault received the loans in April 2009 but had already repaid them by
April 2011, possibly due to the fact that the level of remuneration required was quite high
and constituted an incentive to exit (European Commission, 2011).
Support to the German car industry was included into the general economy stimulus
programs of the German government, denominated Konjunkturpaket I&II, that were ap-
proved in December 2008 and February 2009, respectively.74 Germany notied all schemes
to the Commission under the Temporary Framework. In particular, Opel received a bridging
loan of e1.5 billion for six months at a 6.5% interest rate in the context of the Temporary
Framework (European Commission, 2011) after the US parent company General Motors had
already led for bankruptcy. In those circumstances, the market would have been very re-
luctant to provide a loan to Opel. The loan allowed Opel to develop a restructuring plan.
Eventually, Opel repaid the loan in November 2009.
The Italian plan to support the car industry as of February 2009 was included in a more
general plan to support industrial sectors, denominated Misure urgenti a sostegno dei settori
industriali in crisi. As related to the car industry, the plan included the introduction of a
scrapping scheme to stimulate the demand for cars.75 Italy notied all possible schemes to
the Commission under the Temporary Framework, with the exception of the export-credit
insurance scheme. Fiat did not benet from any specic measures under the Temporary
Framework.
The budget of the Spanish automotive competitiveness plan, denominated Plan de com-
petitividad sector automoción, made up e800 million to support the optimization of pro-
duction processes or reorientation of production in the car industry. That plan was o¢ cially
approved by the European Commission under the GBER in 2009. Under the plan, Seat
received a e100.7 million grant to build a new Audi model in Spain (Eurofound, 2009).
That plan and the eet renewal scheme Plan VIVE were part of the more general plan
of the Spanish government announced at the beginning of 2009, namely Comprehensive
Plan Automotive.76 Spain notied three schemes to the Commission under the Temporary
Framework: limited amounts of aid, guarantees and subsidized loans for green products.
During the nancial and economic crisis, the Swedish government approved a series of
73Source: fair value corporate corporate curve (Industrial) by Bloomberg.
74http://www.bundesregierung.de
75http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/09033l.htm
76The Comprehensive Plan Automotive has been approved within the set of policies approved under the
Spanish Plan to Stimulate the Economy and Employment (http://www.sepe.es/).
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measures to support the automobile industry for the amount of e2.65 billion in the form of
increased investment in research and development, rescue loans and state credit guarantees
for raising EIB loans.77 No scheme was notied to the Commission under the Temporary
Framework except for the export-credit insurance scheme. The Swedish government issued
two subsidized state guarantees on the EIB loans to Volvo and Saab that were notied to
the Commission individually under the Temporary Framework.78 The guarantees raised
criticisms: they were issued to rms that had not been protable for years (Saab) or had
been only marginally protable (Volvo).
The UK Automotive Assistance Programmewas approved in 2009 and envisaged a
package of £ 2 billion of loans and guarantees to the automotive industry. The measures
included guarantees to unlock up to £ 1.3 billion of the EIB loans for investment in lower
carbon initiatives and loans or loan guarantees to support up to £ 1 billion of lending for
other projects related to lower carbon initiatives. In particular, Jaguar Land Rover received
an EIB loan for R&D which was part of the Automotive Assistance Package(Eurofound,
2009). The UK notied three schemes to the Commission under the Temporary Framework:
limited amounts of aid, subsidized interest rates and subsidized loans for green products.
Finally, in November 2008 the Dutch government approved a general stimulus package
to support the national economy. Two schemes were notied to the Commission under the
Temporary Framework: limited amounts of aid and export-credit insurance. In December
2008 Portugal approved a general stimulus package to support its national economy. One
scheme related to limited amounts of aid was notied to the Commission under the Tempo-
rary Framework.79 But in both countries we have not individuated any aid granted to car
producers under those schemes.
Table 9 reports both the gross grant equivalent in nominal value by country and year and
the amount relative to total production by country and year. Only Belgium, France, Ger-
many and Sweden used the Temporary Framework to support their car industries. Although
some schemes in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom clearly targeted the car sectors, they
were not used in practice by those member states. To calculate the aid element for subsi-
dized loans and state guarantees, we used the assumptions stated in paragraph 4.2. For the
Swedish state guarantees case, we used the information on market and subsidized premia
from the two state aid decisions of the Commission on Volvo and Saab. Based on all the
assumptions, the total state aid to the European car producers granted under the Temporary
Framework amounts to e1.2 billion.
77http://www.livemint.com
78Supra note 41.
79Those plans are mentioned in http://www.sefalliance.org
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Table 9: Aid granted under the Temporary Framework
Related scheme Subsidised loans/ Aid element Tot.
Year guarantees 2009 2010 2011
Country Firm emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
Belgium Volvo Guarantees 198.00 19.80 19.80
Tot. Belgium 19.80 19.80
Per production (e) 38.10 2.03
France Peugeot Green products 3,000.00 450.00 450.00
Renault Green products 3,000.00 450.00 450.00
Tot. France 900.00 900.00
Per production (e) 444.71 24.83
Germany Opel Subsidised loans 1,500.00 225.00 225.00
Tot. Germany 225.00 225.00
Per production (e) 46.86 3.64
Sweden Saab Guarantees 400.00 29.00 29.00
Volvo Guarantees 500.00 48.00 48.00
Tot. Sweden 77.00 77.00
Per production (e) 432.82 26.05
Tot. by year 1,125.00 96.80 1,221.80
Per production (e) 96.51 7.45 6.85
Source: State aid register, European Commission (2009), European Commission (2010), European Commission
(2011). This table reports the quantication of the aid element granted under the Temporary Framework related
to the car sector for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Amounts are expressed as gross grant equivalent in nominal value and relative
to the units of production.
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4.9 Support granted by the European Investment Bank
Sources Project database of the EIB-nanced projects.80
Analysis Table 10 reports both the loans to the car industry approved by the EIB by
country and year and the amount relative to total production by country and year. The EIB
does not provide precise information on the interest rate applied to its loans. It can o¤er
loans at or even below Euribor or LIBOR base rates (plus customized credit risk margins)
on a long-term basis without commitment or structuring fees.81 The EIB loans are subject
to the opinion of the Commission, but the substantial assessment of those projects is not
published.
The amounts of loans granted by the EIB to the European car producers have been quite
stable over time, with an average amount of e580 million per year until 2008. EIB loans
are granted to car producers with regional and R&D&I purposes. During the last nancial
and economic crisis, an unprecedented amount of EIB loans were granted to the automotive
industry. The loans may have encouraged companies to continue investing in a sustainable
future, even during a period in which access to credit was very di¢ cult. But the assessment
criteria for the evaluation of these loans by the Commission are not disclosed: it is not
possible to judge whether these funds e¤ectively had an incentive e¤ect and did not alter
the competitive arena.
At company level, BMW got 26% of the EIB loans on a cumulative basis over the last
decade, Ford Corporate (including its Jaguar Land Rover subsidiary during 2000-2008) re-
ceived 19% and Daimler obtained 14%.
BMW in Germany has obtained the largest amount of the EIB loans in absolute terms.
This is mainly due to a large loan granted by the EIB in 2002-2004 for the construction and
tting-out of a car manufacturing plant in Leipzig, Saxony. The project was also supported
by the German government with regional aid. The EIB loans to the BMWplant were justied
by regional motives, given the plants location in a disadvantaged area for which European
Structural Funds can be allocated. The loans to BMW in 2006-2008 were given with R&D&I
and environmental motives, specically for the development of hydrogen-powered passenger
cars or for the general improvement of environmental sustainability of cars. Also in 2009 and
2010 the EIB granted loans to BMW under the ECTF facility to nance R&D&I projects. In
2011 BMW obtained EIB nancing for the development of a complete system of components
for hybridization of passenger vehiclespowertrains on existing sites in Germany.
Ford Motor Company, with its UK subsidiary Jaguar Land Rover, is the second largest
80http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/list/index.htm
81http://www.eib.org/infocentre/faq/index.htm
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loan recipient after BMW. Ford received EIB loans to nance R&D&I projects with envi-
ronmental targets, such as the development of cleaner engines and the adaptation of plants
to environmental standards. In 2004 Ford obtained an EIB loan to nance the program that
should also support the UK automotive industry and contribute to the creation and main-
tenance of employment in the context of extensive restructuring and downsizing by most
vehicle manufacturers during the past few years in the United Kingdom. Land Rover re-
ceived support in 2003, also with regional motivations. Finally, Jaguar Land Rover received
support in 2003 and 2006 for the development of two new versions of existing Land Rover
models.
Daimler received around a third of the amount of the EIB loans granted to BMW. In
particular, the EIB loan given to Daimler in 2001 was aimed at the production of a new
generation of minivans in Ludwigsfelde, Brandenburg. The biggest portion of the EIB loans
to Daimler was granted under the ECTF program. Those loans, authorized by the EIB in
2009 and 2010, were aimed at R&D nancing to optimize fuel e¢ ciency and reduce carbon
dioxide emissions. In 2011 Daimler received an EIB loan for the R&D&I of the companys
truck division to improve fuel consumption, reduce emissions and enhance overall e¢ ciency
of eet.
4.10 Social public support granted by the European Social Fund
and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
Sources The European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Globalisation Adjustment
Fund (EGF) webpages and publications.82 ;83 We have not found any aid cases related to
these funds requiring a separate notication and approval by the Commission in the state
aid register.
Analysis Table 11 reports both the absolute amount of funds granted to the car industry
under the EGF by country and year and the amount of funds relative to total production
by country and year.
The EGF support has been granted to the car industry to ease the e¤ects of major
structural changes in world trade before the crisis or to alleviate the consequences of the last
nancial and economic crisis. In particular, applications for public support from the EGF
increased in correspondence of the crisis. The Fund has been in operation since January
2007. The EGF provides support for active market labor policies, such as occupational
82http://ec.europa.eu/esf/
83http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=326&langId=en
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Table 11: Support granted under the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
Country Firm emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
Belgium GM 14.80 14.80
Tot. Belgium 14.80 14.80
Per production (e) 284.79 15.18
France Renault 37.70 37.70
Tot. France 37.70 37.70
Per production (e) 17.13 1.04
Portugal Lisboa-Alentejo 4.80 4.80
Tot. Portugal 4.80 4.80
Per production (e) 28.32 1.99
Spain Cataluna 4.30 4.30
Tot. Spain 4.30 4.30
Per production (e) 1.81 0.13
Sweden Volvo 15.10 15.10
Tot. Sweden 15.10 15.10
Per production (e) 117.29 5.11
Tot. by year 4.80 15.10 4.30 52.50 76.70
Per production (e) 0.31 1.30 0.33 4.04 0.43
Source: EGF webpage. This table reports the amount of public support under the EGF related to the car sector
for the period 2007-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Amounts are expressed in absolute value and relative to the units of production.
guidance and training. For instance, in 2009 the EGF issued a e9.8 million grant to help
the 1,500 most disadvantaged workers to return to employment from three Volvo Car plants
and 23 suppliers and customers.
Support granted under the ESF consists of two clearly-dened cases regarding the car
industry in the ESF project database. The rst project took place in Sweden in 2010 to
nance a job-centre project aimed at helping employees to update their skills and making
them more adjustable to the job market. This project of e1.8 million was co-funded together
with Volvo Cars, AB Volvo and several suppliers. Another project of e225,000 supported
Volvo plant in Belgium. Moreover, the ESF funds have been used to co-nance measures of
requalication and training during short-time working in Germany (Eurofound, 2009), but
the exact amount is not disclosed.84
84To collect more detailed information on the ESF projects, national authorities responsible for the man-
agement of the Structural Funds of the European Union need to be contacted, which has however not been
feasible given the limited duration of our project.
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4.11 Support granted through scrapping schemes
Sources The sources are the following: (i) France: the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable
Development, Transport and Housing85, (ii) Germany: the German Federal O¢ ce of Eco-
nomics and Export Control86, (iii) United Kingdom: the UK Society of Motor Manufacturers
and Traders87.
Reports from Germany and the United Kingdom provide complete information on scrap-
ping programs to assess the amount of public support granted to individual car producers.
For France the information on scrapping schemes is fragmented, so the discussion will be
more limited.
Other countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain have approved the
scrapping schemes as a response to the nancial and economic crisis as well. In some countries
scrapping schemes were in e¤ect before the crisis (for instance in Italy, Portugal, Spain).
Since there is no detailed information on those schemes, especially across car producers, we
have to exclude those countries from the detailed analysis of scrapping programs.
Analysis Table 12 reports the absolute amount granted to the car industry under the
scrapping schemes in Germany, France and the United Kingdom by country and year.
The German and UK reports contain the detailed information on the number of new
vehicles purchased (and one-year old cars in case of Germany). We have multiplied those
numbers on the new car purchases by the amount of the incentive - e2,500 in Germany and
£ 1,000 in the United Kingdom - to calculate the total amounts of benets in the form of
scrapping consumer incentives to individual car producers.
The German scrapping scheme was the most generous in terms of government budget
(e5 billion). The program promoted the sales of both domestic (VW, Opel and Ford) and
foreign (Fiat and Renault, in particular Dacia) brands.
In the United Kingdom the scrapping scheme especially beneted foreign car producers
Hyundai, Ford, VW, Fiat and Toyota. Among the car producers, only Toyota produces
cars in the United Kingdom. The program was not very successful for the domestic brand
Vauxhall.
The information on the French scheme is available jointly for the years 2008 and 2009,
and jointly for two scrapping schemes superbonusand prime à la casse. Around 60% of
vehicles that were sold under the schemes were domestic brands. The benet of the domestic
brands from the scheme appears to be higher compared to Germany and the United Kingdom.
85http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/La-prime-a-la-casse-un-tiers-des.html
86http://www.bafa.de/bafa/de/wirtschaftsfoerderung/umweltpraemie/publikationen/ump_abschlussbericht.pdf.
87https://www.smmt.co.uk/2010/05/scrappage-registrations-total-395-500-units/.
64
This outcome may be linked to the CO2 condition on the purchase of new cars in France
that could have favored domestic cars more than foreign ones.
4.12 Overall quantication of public support to the European car
industry
Table 13 provides a summary of the amount of public support granted to the European car
industry over the past decade.
With regard to state aid support, we sum up the aid elements that we can estimate
consistently based on the state aid decisions published in the Commissions register: GBER
aid, regional aid, training aid, R&R aid and aid granted to car producers under the Tem-
porary Framework. Our estimates of state aid support reect the planned aid amounts, but
the actual aid expenditure may di¤er. The Commission does not estimate the di¤erence
between the planned budget and the actual aid amount granted to companies. We assume
that, on average, the planned and actual amounts do not di¤er much. On the one hand,
once the aid is authorized, member states are likely to grant at least the amount approved
by the Commission because the aid is necessary for the execution of investment projects by
companies. On the other hand, member states may be unwilling to grant amounts of aid
higher than the authorized ones because of possible controls by the Commission triggered
by the annual report on aid expenditures, or by external complaints on unlawfully-granted
aid.
Our overall estimate of state aid is a lower bound estimate of state aid granted to the
European car producers over the past decade. In particular, our estimate does not include
the aid granted in the form of schemes, unless (i) the aid is individually notied under the
approved scheme to the Commission, and the aid decision is published in the register, or
(ii) we can infer the information on the granted aid amounts from the Commissions reports
published ex post. In the case of aid granted under the Temporary Framework, the aid gures
report the actual aid amounts which are equal to the planned aid amounts as announced
by the Belgian, German, French and Swedish governments. We do not consider other cases
of aid granted on the basis of schemes in our overall quantication exercise for two reasons:
(i) either the information is not available, (ii) or in case of the aid granted through schemes
and published in the register of the Transparency system, we do not include the regional
aid and R&D&I aid amounts that reect the actual aid awarded to the car producers. As
we have seen from the example of regional aid, the amounts granted based on the regional
schemes might be at least as high as the amounts of regional aid authorized in the individual
state aid decisions.
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Table 12: Support granted under scrapping schemes
Year 2008-2009 2009-2010
Estimated benets Budget share Estimated benets Budget share
Country Firm emil. % emil. %
France Fiat 29.00 4.80
Ford 33.90 5.60
Opel 26.00 4.30
Peugeot 240.80 39.80
Renault 156.10 25.80
Toyota 23.00 3.80
VW 25.40 4.20
Other brands 70.80 11.70
Tot. France 605.00
Germany Hyundai 125.11 3.19
Fiat 273.70 6.97
Ford 258.80 6.59
Nissan 102.60 2.61
Opel 400.93 10.22
Peugeot 255.09 6.50
Renault 340.69 8.68
Suzuki 84.80 2.16
Toyota 172.02 4.38
VW 1,503.31 38.31
Other brands 407.16 10.38
Tot. Germany 3,924.21
UK Fiat 34.56 7.78
Ford 49.78 11.21
Honda 14.18 3.19
Hyundai 87.71 19.76
Mazda 12.74 2.87
Nissan 17.41 3.92
Peugeot 31.39 7.07
Renault 15.93 3.59
Suzuki 13.81 3.11
Toyota 32.31 7.28
Vauxhall 29.65 6.68
VW 51.86 11.68
Other brands 52.62 11.85
Tot. UK 443.94
Tot. by year 605 4,368.15
Source: French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing, German Federal O¢ ce
of Economics and Export Control and UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. This table reports
the public support granted under the scrapping schemes related to the car sector for the period 2008-2010 in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Estimated benets are expressed in absolute value. Budget share
is calculated as percentage of the sum of scrapping incentives granted on a producers car sales in terms of the
total schemes government budget in a respective country.
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Table 13: Summary of quantication of public support for the European car industry
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tot.
emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil. emil.
State aid support instrument
GBER 3.80 3.80
Regional aid 46.04 302.92 590.12 78.52 26.54 106.37 7.40 89.27 15.82 51.37 1,314.36
Training aid 19.72 2.65 54.57 4.57 14.22 5.55 23.19 14.68 17.09 156.24
R&R aid 6.50 6.50
Temporary 1,125.00 96.80 1,221.80
Framework
Tot. by year 46.04 322.64 592.77 133.08 31.11 127.09 12.95 23.19 14.68 1,214.27 112.62 68.46 2,698.90
Per unit of 2.86 19.89 37.00 8.37 1.96 8.18 0.85 1.48 1.04 104.16 8.67 5.27 15.13
production (e)
Non-state aid support instrument
EIB loans 525.00 845.00 400.00 580.00 550.00 245.00 697.00 750.00 650.00 2,800.00 2,822.00 1195.00 12,059.00
aid element 78.75 126.75 60.00 87.00 82.50 36.75 104.55 112.50 97.50 420.00 423.30 179.25 1,808.85
EGF support 4.80 15.10 4.30 52.50 76.70
Scrapping 19.19 4,057.17 1,334.90 12.00 5,423.26
schemes
Source: own estimations. This table reports the quantication of the public support for the European car sector
for the period 2000-2011 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. State aid support is expressed as gross grant equivalent in present value and relative to
the units of production. Non-state aid support is expressed in nominal value. In the case of state aid support
instruments, we show the aid element, whereas in the case of non-state aid support instruments, we report the
total amount of public support (the aid element can only be approximated for EIB loans). Empty cells mean
that no relevant public support is awarded in those years.
The overall state aid to the European car industry has declined over the past decade, but
peaked in response to the nancial and economic crisis in 2009. After the crisis it decreased
in 2010 and 2011 to a level even lower than the average level over the pre-crisis period.
With regard to non-state aid support, we discuss the amount of support granted under
each instrument separately. Our ndings are threefold. First, the EIB loans were intensively
granted to the car sector before the crisis, and went up considerably in response to the crisis
in 2009 and 2010, and decreased by more than half in 2011. The loans granted in 2009
and 2010 were almost ve times larger than the average yearly volume of loans granted over
the pre-crisis period. EIB loans do not constitute state aid, but since they are granted at
lower than market interest rates, we calculated the nancial benet of those loans to the car
producers (the so called aid element). As the information on the actual interest rates is
not available, we followed the practice of the Commission and took 15% of the total amount
of the EIB loans as a proxy for the aid element.
Second, the EGF funds granted to the car industry also increased following the crisis to
ease the consequences of the restructuring process in the car industry. In the EGF project
database, we observe a long lag between the actual application date for the funds and the
date when the funds are actually released to beneciaries. This might explain the increased
amount of funds granted under the EGF in 2011. The exact amount of public support
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through the ESF funds is di¢ cult to quantify because public information is scarce.
Third, member states granted an unprecedented amount of public support through the
scrapping schemes to foster the local demand for cars in the crisis times. We estimate
the total amount of nancial benets in the form of scrapping consumer incentives to the
European car sector on the basis of government budgets. On the grounds of the available
information, we can cover only three countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom),
while scrapping schemes were used also in other European countries: we can then provide
only an underestimation of the nancial benets to the European car producers through the
scrapping incentives.
Note that when the crisis peaked in 2009, the amount of state aid granted under the
Temporary Framework was lower than the public support granted to the European car
producers in the form of scrapping schemes and EIB loans. Therefore, while analyzing public
transfers to companies, it is important to consider various instruments of public support to
get a complete picture of public interventions in the car industry.
Finally, we consider the mix of instruments that member states have chosen to grant
public support to the car industry. Table 14 visualizes these instruments by country. GBER
aid is only found in Spain. Regional aid and training aid were granted by almost all countries
in our sample. R&R aid was granted only once in the United Kingdom. R&D&I aid was
rarely granted, but large amounts of the EIB loans were granted to the industry with the
same purpose. The Temporary Framework probably substituted aid granted for R&R and
R&D&I purposes. It was used by four countries: Belgium, France, Germany and Sweden.
Scrapping schemes were introduced in almost all countries over the past decade.
Table 14: Mix of forms of public support for the European car industry
Country GBER Regional Training R&D&I R&R Temporary EIB Social Scrapping
Framework loans support programs
Belgium + + + +
France + + + + + +
Germany + + + + + +
Italy + + + +
Netherlands +
Portugal + + + + +
Spain + + + + +
Sweden + + + +
UK + + + + +
The table reports the nine instruments of public support for the European car industry for the period 2000-2011
in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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5 Conclusion
Economic assessment of di¤erent instruments to support the car industry Our
research suggests that economic analysis in controlling state aid to the car sector carried out
by the European Commission clearly identies the objectives, incentives and side e¤ects of
aid measures. Despite the recognition of the fact that aid to the car sector can be particularly
distorting, the Temporary Framework has de facto implied a relaxation of state aid rules,
and in particular of R&R aid and R&D&I aid to the car sector during the crisis. Under
the Temporary Framework, large amounts of aid were granted to car companies without the
usual requirements of notication and individual assessment. Moreover, the loans provided
by the European Investment Bank for R&D&I projects increased considerably during the
crisis. EIB loans resemble in their purpose regional aid or R&D&I aid. However, they are
subject only to a non-binding opinion of the Commission, while regional aid and R&D&I
aid fall under the scrutiny of the Commission. The substantial assessment of EIB projects is
not published, so we cannot infer the criteria applied by the Commission in the assessment.
We recommend increasing the transparency of the evaluation process, both due to the large
amounts at stake and due to the importance and the particular value of innovation in this
industry.
An unprecedented amount of public support has also been granted through the large-scale
scrapping programs introduced by many member states in response to the crisis. Scrapping
subsidies do not constitute state aid since ex ante these measures are assumed not to be
selective, namely granted without discrimination. But the environmental requirements to
obtain the subsidy could de facto discriminate across producers. The Commission does not
evaluate whether scrapping programs are selective after their implementation.
The existence of multiple aid instruments at di¤erent levels may create coordination
problems and lack of transparency despite the e¤orts of the Commission in this respect.
In general, international coordination across countries to reduce overcapacity in the world
clearly failed during the crisis. It is an open question as to whether the Commission managed
to coordinate these instruments at least within the European Union. The cases of France and
Germany, where national car producers largely beneted during the crisis, seem to suggest a
negative answer, although we recognize the role of the Commission in limiting subsidy races
between countries.
Quantication of public support to the car industry The quantication of state
aid to the European car industry is a challenging task for three main reasons. First, the
availability of the information on the state aid element depends on whether a public support
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measure is scrutinized by the Commission or not. Second, the extent of available information
depends on whether state aid is granted to individual companies or is in the form of schemes
to multiple companies. Third, the quantication of the aid element depends on whether
state aid is granted in the form of a grant, soft loan or guarantee. Consequently, we quantify
the aid element whenever this is possible. For non-state aid support, we report the total
amount of public support granted under each instrument.
With regard to state aid support, regional aid was the most used aid instrument before
the crisis. Overall, it declined during the last decade. In nominal terms, the largest regional
aid granter has been Germany, followed by Spain and Italy. Portugal has granted most aid
relative to production. At the company level, the largest aid recipient is BMW, followed
by Fiat and Ford. Training aid was the second largest aid category before the crisis. In
nominal terms and relative to production, Italy has granted the most training aid, followed
by Belgium and the United Kingdom. At company level, the biggest share of training aid
belongs to Fiat in Italy, followed by Ford and GM Europe in various European locations.
R&D&I aid and R&R aid were rarely granted to the car sector during the past decade. Those
two instruments were not used during the last nancial and economic crisis, when aid with
similar purposes was primarily granted to car producers under the Temporary Framework.
Especially France, Germany and Sweden used the Temporary Framework to support their
domestic production. Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom notied some schemes targeted
at the car sectors but did not use them.
With regard to non-state aid support, EIB loans were granted in large amounts to the car
industry before the crisis and increased considerably as a response to the crisis, in particular
to guarantee the necessary ow of credit to car producers until banks resumed their normal
lending activities. The EGF applications also increased following the crisis. The exact
amount of the public support through the ESF funds is di¢ cult to quantify because publicly
available information is scarce. Finally, an unprecedented amount of public support was
granted to the European car producers during the crisis through scrapping programs to foster
the local demand for cars. The scheme in France clearly beneted domestic car producers,
whereas the schemes in Germany and the United Kingdom beneted both domestic and
foreign car producers. The success of home products in France may be attributed to a
domestic bias of consumers, or to the CO2 emission requirements specied by the French
scrapping scheme. The British and German schemes did not specify those requirements.
Our lower bound estimate of overall state aid to the European car industry suggests
that the aid has declined during the last decade, but increased in response to the crisis in
2009 and decreased even below the average pre-crisis level in 2010 and 2011. However, in
2009 European car producers received higher amounts of public support through scrapping
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schemes and EIB loans than regular state aid. This support might have caused distortionary
e¤ects on competition and trade. When analyzing public transfers to the car industry, it is
therefore important to consider all di¤erent instruments of public support.
In conclusion, the quantication of public support for the car industry at national and
European level is a challenging exercise. Although the European Commission analyzes the
evolution of state aid in its Scoreboard reports, it publishes no analysis of state aid at
the industry level: One cannot follow whether some industries are treated more favorably
than others and how the industry-specic aid has evolved over time. We recommend more
clarity on the part of the Commission concerning the existence of various public support
instruments and regarding the ways of notifying (ex ante) and monitoring/reporting (ex
post) public support measures. This could allow an easier quantication of state aid and
non-state aid support granted to any industry or sector, and increase the transparency of
state aid control and enforcement.
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